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NOTES

A BATTLE OF THE AMENDMENTS:
WHY ENDING DISCRIMINATION
IN THE COURTROOM MAY INHIBIT
A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S RIGHT
TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY
Gina M. Chiappetta*
Since the U.S. Supreme Court began limiting the exercise of peremptory
challenges to safeguard potential jurors from discrimination, it has faced a
nearly impossible task. The Court has attempted to safeguard a juror’s
equal protection rights without eradicating the peremptory challenge’s
ability to preserve a criminal defendant’s right to an impartial jury. Under
the current legal framework, it is not certain whether either constitutional
right is adequately protected. This Note examines the history of the
Supreme Court’s limitation on peremptory challenges. It then discusses the
current federal circuit split over whether peremptory challenges should be
further limited. Finally, this Note concludes that the existing framework’s
application should be extended and restricted to more effectively protect the
constitutional rights at issue.
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INTRODUCTION
James Kirkland Batson was an African American man charged with
burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 1 During voir dire proceedings prior to
the start of his trial, the prosecutor used four of his six peremptory
challenges to remove every African American from the venire. 2 The result:
Batson was convicted by an all-white jury. 3
By its definition, a peremptory strike is not “subject to the court’s
control”—its exercise cannot be challenged. 4 In 1986, however, when the
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision to
affirm Batson’s conviction, it imposed the first of many limitations on the
exercise of peremptory challenges. 5 Relying heavily on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
this seminal case, Batson v. Kentucky, 6 very narrowly. It held that
prosecutors could not exercise peremptory strikes against veniremen solely
on the basis that they share the same race as the defendant.7
Justice Thurgood Marshall did not have much faith in the Court’s
solution, however. He predicted that ending racial discrimination in the
jury selection process would “be accomplished only by eliminating
peremptory challenges entirely.” 8 Three decades later, the peremptory
challenge no longer lives up to its name. In several attempts to temper the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986).
Id. at 83.
Id.
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
See infra Part I.B.2–3.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 93–95.
Id. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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discrimination peremptory challenges facilitate, Batson has been extended
far beyond its original bounds. 9 Now, civil and criminal litigants are
prohibited from peremptorily dismissing a venireman based on their race or
gender, regardless of whether the stricken juror shares the race or gender of
a litigant. 10 Whether or not Batson can be applied to further limit the
procedure, however, is complicated.
Batson’s scope has been narrowed so that peremptory challenges may be
freely exercised against any group entitled to rational basis review under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 11 For example, race and gender, classifications
entitled to heightened scrutiny, are unconstitutional bases for peremptory
challenges. 12 Mental handicap, on the other hand, is a permissible basis for
a peremptory strike, as a classification only entitled to rational basis
review. 13 This limiting principle is not as easily applied, however, when it
is unclear to which standard of review a group is entitled.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 14 an antitrust dispute
between two producers of HIV medication, demonstrates the confusion
plaguing the Batson regime. 15 The district court needed to decide whether
a peremptory challenge against a homosexual member of the venire
potentially violated Batson. 16 SmithKline’s counsel argued that the “wellknown” presence of AIDS in the homosexual community motivated Abbott
to exercise its peremptory challenge on the basis of the juror’s sexual
orientation. 17 The judge responded, “Well, I don’t know that, number one,
whether Batson applies in civil, and number two, whether Batson ever
applies to sexual orientation.” 18 Ultimately, the Batson challenge was
rejected. 19 Yet, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit became the second circuit to
recognize sexual orientation as a classification entitled to heightened
scrutiny, and the first federal court to prohibit the exercise of peremptory
challenges based on sexual orientation. 20
It is uncertain not only whether the Batson regime permits such a
prohibition but also whether the Ninth Circuit’s expansion will successfully
prevent discriminatory peremptory strikes. As Justice Marshall predicted,
despite several limitations on the exercise of peremptory challenges, the
jury selection process continues to evince many kinds of discrimination.21
Still, in the face of more than thirty years of persistent criticism, the
peremptory strike has persevered.
9. See infra Part I.B.3.
10. See infra Part I.B.3.
11. See infra Part I.C.
12. See infra Part I.C.1–2.
13. See infra Part I.C.1–2.
14. 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
15. Id. at 474.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 475.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (permitting
peremptory strikes on the basis of classifications entitled to rational basis review).
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The reason for this perseverance is that, despite the costs of permitting
the procedure, prohibiting the exercise of peremptory challenges entirely
also has costs. 22 This Note examines the costs and the value of the
peremptory challenge, and discusses whether Batson should be extended to
prohibit sexual orientation–based strikes. To this end, Part I discusses the
merits and shortcomings of peremptory challenges, and explains the ways
in which Batson and subsequent cases limit the exercise of peremptory
strikes. Part II discusses the two interpretations of Batson’s scope
employed by the federal circuit courts. The first prohibits and the second
permits sexual orientation–based peremptory strikes. Part III critically
assesses the Batson regime and suggests that, to reduce the costs of further
regulation of peremptory strikes, the Batson framework be altered to limit
the circumstances under which a Batson challenge may be raised.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE BATSON REGIME AND ITS REGULATION OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The Supreme Court once defined a peremptory strike of a venireman 23 as
a challenge “exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without
being subject to the court’s control.” 24 In 1986, however, the Court decided
Batson. This seminal case used the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause 25 to empower courts to limit the motives with which a
party may exercise peremptory strikes. 26 Part I.A discusses the virtues and
deficiencies of limiting peremptory challenges. Part I.B traces the
evolution of Supreme Court doctrine governing the exercise of peremptory
strikes. Part I.C explores how the Fourteenth Amendment’s three-tiered
system of judicial review limits the scope of Batson’s protections.
A. Peremptory Challenges: Their Merits and Shortcomings
During voir dire 27 proceedings, litigants have the opportunity to question
prospective jurors to gain information that enables them to remove jurors
from the venire. 28 There are two procedures that facilitate this removal:
for-cause and peremptory challenges. A party may remove a prospective
juror from the venire either by arguing to excuse a venireman peremptorily

22. See infra Part I.A.1.
23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1789 (10th ed. 2014) (“A prospective juror; a member of
a jury panel.”).
24. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
26. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
27. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1805 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “voir dire” as the
preliminary examination of prospective jurors by a judge or lawyer to decide whether “the
prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury” that is informally referred to as “the
jury-selection phase of a trial”).
28. See id. at 1789 (“A ‘venire’ is a panel of persons selected for jury duty and from
among whom the jurors are to be chosen.”).

2002

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

or for-cause. 29 So long as it offers a “narrowly specified, provable and
legally cognizable basis of partiality” for a strike, a litigant may exercise an
unlimited number of for-cause challenges. 30 Common bases of for-cause
strikes include a prospective juror’s “familial or social relationship to one of
the parties, failure to meet statutory qualifications for jury duty, or other
specific evidence of bias.” 31
A peremptory strike, on the other hand, need not be “supported by a
reason.” 32 Rather, a peremptory challenge, theoretically, allows a party to
exclude a member of the venire without justifying the strike to the court.33
In recent decades, however, the Supreme Court has defined certain
circumstances in which a party must divulge its reason for peremptorily
striking a venireman. 34 As the application of Batson has been expanded to
limit the exercise of peremptory challenges, so too has the litany of
arguments in favor of, and against, preserving the practice. 35
To grasp the split among federal courts of appeals, it is important to
understand the virtues and shortcomings of peremptory challenges.
1. Arguments in Favor of Maintaining Peremptory Challenges
The perseverance of peremptory challenges throughout history is often
cited as a justification for their continued use. 36 While peremptory
challenges have been part of almost every system of jury trial, “from the
Romans to today,” American colonists adopted the peremptory challenge
from the eighteenth-century English legal system. 37 Under that regime, the
prosecutor was afforded unlimited exercise of peremptory strikes, whereas
criminal defendants were allotted only thirty-five. 38 While the use of such
challenges was considered a “right” in American Colonies, 39 the practice

29. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power,” 27 STAN. L.
REV. 545, 549–50 (1975).
30. Coburn R. Beck, The Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 961, 963 (1998).
31. Id. at 964.
32. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (10th ed. 2014).
33. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
34. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 144–45 (1994) (explaining
that, as with “race-based Batson claims,” counsel must articulate its basis for a peremptory
challenge only if a prima facie case of intentional discrimination is established); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (holding that if a party establishes a prima facie case that
opposing counsel has exercised a peremptory strike based on juror’s race, opposing counsel
may refute the accusation by a articulating non-discriminatory reason for the strike).
35. See infra Part I.A.1–2.
36. See Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and Beyond: The Paradoxical Quest for
Reasoned Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Process, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 947, 953
(1994).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214–17 (1965) (discussing the origins
of the peremptory challenge in United States).
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was not adopted by the U.S. Constitution. 40 Nonetheless, the exercise of
peremptory strikes is incorporated into both federal and state statutes, and
their use continues uninterrupted in the United States. 41 The historical
persistence of peremptory strikes “demonstrate[s] the long and widely held
belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury.” 42
In addition to this history, the use of peremptory challenges is justified as
a method by which a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury 43 is safeguarded. 44 Since no objective basis to peremptorily
strike a juror must be offered, parties may remove a prospective juror based
simply on a negative intuition, “not necessarily capable of clear
articulation,” that a juror maintains a certain bias. 45 In other words,
peremptory challenges ensure that a partial venireman will not remain on
the jury simply because an attorney is unable to prove his or her bias.46
Moreover, peremptory challenges allow litigants, “those whose fortunes
are at issue,” to choose their own jury. 47 Consider that, without having to
meet any sort of legal standard, a litigant may dismiss any person he or she
dislikes from the venire. This gives the litigants, and through them, the
public, confidence that “the jury is a good and proper mode for deciding
matters and that its decision should be followed.” 48 It is important not only
that the jury be fair and impartial, but also that to the litigants, it seems to
be so. 49 “As Justice Frankfurter once wrote: ‘The appearance of
impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality.’” 50
Peremptory strikes also protect jurors and promote the efficiency and
integrity of the voir dire proceedings. 51 During voir dire, lawyers and
judges ask prospective jurors about their “private attitudes and practices—
40. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (“There is nothing in the
Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory
challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured.”).
41. Carlson, supra note 36, at 953, 949.
42. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State . . . .”).
44. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“The principal value of the peremptory is that it helps produce fair and impartial juries.”);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (stating that the use of peremptory strikes is
“one means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury”).
45. Carlson, supra note 36, at 954.
Insuring a party’s right to a fair trial has been the historical justification for a
system that allows the unchallenged exercise of peremptory strikes. Allowing
counsel to strike prospective jurors without enunciating a reason is a recognition of
the many biases and prejudices that all humans foster, and of the potential for a
prospective juror’s failure to perceive that bias. It would be fruitless to inquire of
unknown prejudices that a juror might harbor.
Id. at 953–54.
46. See id.
47. Babcock, supra note 29, at 552.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 182 (1950)).
51. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 158 (1989).
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asking, for example, about the jurors’ religious beliefs, drinking habits,
jobs, hobbies, and prior experience with lawyers, then asking about their
relatives’ jobs, experiences as crime victims, and arrest records as well.” 52
Consider that, because of the option to exercise a peremptory challenge, a
potential juror may be relieved of the further extensive inquiry regarding
her biases and prejudices that would be necessary to establish basis for a
for-cause challenge. 53 Should those questions be asked, the sensitive and
embarrassing nature of the inquiry may cause an otherwise impartial juror
to develop ill feelings toward, or a bias against, an attorney and his client. 54
Along the same lines, peremptory challenges allow attorneys to silently
rely on “[c]ommon human experience, common sense, psychosociological
studies, and public opinion polls” to inform their decisions. 55 Such reliance
is important because judges conduct voir dire examinations in many courts,
or at the very least restrict the number and types of questions counsel may
ask. 56 While certainly promoting expediency, such procedures leave
attorneys with limited information to support an argument for-cause.57
Moreover, peremptory challenges render unnecessary certain group-bias
arguments, like “middle-aged civil servants would be unable to decide on
the evidence.” 58 Such arguments are not only “societally divisive” 59 but
also more likely than not to be rejected, regardless of their accuracy. 60 In
fact, for-cause challenges are regularly rejected, “even when common sense
indicates that there must be a bias—as long as the potential juror says that
she would decide the case ‘only on the evidence presented,’ and would not
be influenced by any other factor.” 61
Despite these virtues, the peremptory strike is heavily criticized, 62 and so
arguments in favor of eliminating or limiting the exercise of peremptory
challenges must be addressed.
2. Arguments in Favor of Eliminating Peremptory Challenges
Critics of the peremptory strike argue that the procedure may actually
inhibit a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
52. Id.
53. Babcock, supra note 29, at 554–55.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 553.
56. Id. at 548.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 553.
59. Id. at 553–54 (“[T]o allow this knowledge to be expressed in the evaluative terms
necessary for challenges for cause would undercut our desire for a society in which all
people are judged as individuals and in which each is held reasonable and open to
compromise . . . . Although experience reveals that black males as a class can be biased
against young alienated blacks who have not tried to join the middle class, to enunciate this
in the concrete expression required of a challenge for cause is societally divisive. Instead we
have evolved in the peremptory challenge a system that allows the covert expression of what
we dare not say but know is true more often tha[n] not.”).
60. Id. at 549–50.
61. Id.
62. See infra Part I.A.2.
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They posit that parties do not exercise peremptory strikes in order to ensure
an impartial jury at all.63 Instead, each selects jurors who will be partial or
amenable to their position. 64 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Batson,
rejected the argument that since both parties have the ability to select jurors
that are partial to their side, the juror’s biases will cancel each other out. 65
As such, critics argue that eliminating or reducing the number of
peremptory challenges would result in a more efficient and cost-effective
jury selection process. 66 Without peremptory strikes, they argue, fewer
veniremen would be excluded from the jury, thus, expediting the voir dire
process and resulting in fewer citizens being called for jury duty. 67
Moreover, litigants would save money and time spent consulting so-called
jury experts who specialize in determining which jurors will be favorable to
their side. 68 Should peremptory challenges be eliminated, trial courts
would also save time by avoiding Batson hearings 69 to determine if a party
silently employed a permissible motive when peremptorily excusing a
juror. 70
The use of peremptory challenges to select a jury, either partial or
impartial, also appears to necessitate prejudgment of individuals, a practice
that is seemingly inconsistent with “democratic ideals such as equality and
fairness.” 71 By its nature, a peremptory strike is discriminatory and
“reflects a preconceived notion or negative intuition as to how a prospective
juror will evaluate one’s client and case.” 72
Peremptory challenges may also compromise the cross-sectional ideal73
by allowing a jury to be composed of quite like-minded individuals. 74 Such

63. Babcock, supra note 29, at 551.
64. Id. “Of course, neither litigant is trying to choose ‘impartial’ jurors, but rather to
eliminate those who are sympathetic to the other side, hopefully leaving only those biased
for him.” Id.
65. See Alschuler, supra note 51, at 205 (“The Batson decision . . . rejected the
proposition that two wrongs make a right.”). The ability of the defense counsel in Batson to
peremptorily challenge whites did not justify the prosecutor’s challenge of blacks. Id.
66. PATRICIA HENLEY, PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH INSTITUTE, IMPROVING THE JURY SYSTEM:
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 1, http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/plri/juryper.pdf (last
visited Feb. 23, 2015).
67. Id. at 3–4.
68. Id. at 4 (indicating that studies show that efforts to predict how a juror will decide a
case, based on stereotypes, are rarely successful).
69. See infra Part I.B.4.
70. See Henley, supra note 66, at 3.
71. Id.
72. Carlson, supra note 36, at 953.
73. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (explaining that the cross-sectional
ideal represents the idea that the group from which a jury is selected “must not
systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably
representative thereof”); see also Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (“It is part of the
established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a
body truly representative of the community.”). “The cross-sectional ideal is based on the
idea that there is no way to escape from bias.” Henley, supra note 66, at 4. “The only way to
deal with prejudice is to have a balance of various values and perspectives on the jury.” Id.
74. Henley, supra note 66, at 4.
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a composition potentially undermines the validity of jury verdicts.75
Consider that when a group is systematically excluded from the jury it is
potentially less likely that the verdict will “reflect the values of the
community as a whole.” 76
Furthermore, a diverse jury arguably increases the probability that
individuals with different backgrounds and opinions may be able to correct
“mistaken views or recollections of evidence presented at trial.” 77 Said
differently, peremptory challenges that are used to eliminate jurors based on
certain characteristics may increase the probability that prejudices will go
unchallenged during deliberation. 78 If peremptory strikes are eliminated, a
resulting jury could be more representative of the community and, as a
result, render a more widely accepted verdict.79
As arguments for further expanding Batson persist, these merits and
shortcomings of peremptory strikes must be considered. For those who
believe that the peremptory strike has little power to protect a criminal
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, Batson’s
expansion has few, if any, costs. The opposite is true, however, if the
peremptory challenge is considered a safeguard of impartiality.
B. The Evolution of the Batson Challenge:
How the Fourteenth Amendment Limits
the Once Unrestricted Exercise of Peremptory Strikes
Prior to Batson, the exercise of peremptory challenges, although finite in
number, was unrestrained. 80 Since that case was decided, however, a
number of restrictions have been placed on the exercise of peremptory
strikes. Part I.B.1 introduces the pre-1986 peremptory challenge regime
and the cases leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson. Part
I.B.2 discusses Batson and the Supreme Court’s shift in focus to the
Fourteenth Amendment. Part I.B.3 considers the cases that have expanded
Batson’s application, and Part I.B.4 examines the effect these cases have
had on the Batson inquiry.
1. Pre-Batson Decisions
In 1879, the Supreme Court decided Strauder v. West Virginia, 81 and
first addressed whether criminal defendants had a right to a trial by a jury

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The cross-sectional ideal is considered a means by which to achieve an impartial
jury. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 754–56 (Cal. 1978). The best means of achieving an
impartial jury is to promote a jury composed of various types of people with different views,
whose respective biases, “to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel each other
out.” Id. at 755.
78. Henley, supra note 66, at 4.
79. Id. at 5.
80. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
81. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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“impanelled without discrimination . . . because of race or color.” 82 The
case evaluated the constitutionality of a West Virginia statute that restricted
eligibility to participate on a jury, stating, “All white male persons who are
twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to
serve as jurors, except as herein provided.” 83 The Court reasoned that
systematically denying blacks the right to participate “in the administration
of the law, as jurors,” based solely on their race, was an “impediment to
securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others.” 84
While Strauder prevented states from statutorily denying black males the
right to be called for jury service, it did not prevent them from being
peremptorily dismissed based on their race. 85 In other words, the case
simply ensured black men the right to be part of the venire, not the right to
be chosen to sit on the jury. 86 Under Strauder, therefore, it was possible
that upon completion of voir dire proceedings, the resulting jury would be
entirely homogenous. 87
Subsequent cases similarly expounded this foundation, determining that
while a black defendant was not entitled to a jury comprised of members of
his own race, 88 the Equal Protection Clause was violated when a state
deliberately excluded citizens from participating in “the administration of
justice” based on race. 89 The Court recognized that “[j]urymen should be
selected as individuals, on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as
members of a race.” 90 Furthermore, it concluded that excluding citizens,
African American or otherwise, 91 from jury service based on race, not only
violated the Equal Protection Clause but was also “at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.” 92

82. Id. at 305.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 308 (“If in those States where the colored people constitute a majority of the
entire population a law should be enacted excluding all white men from jury service, thus
denying to them the privilege of participating equally with the blacks in the administration of
justice, we apprehend no one would be heard to claim that it would not be a denial to white
men of the equal protection of the laws. Nor if a law should be passed excluding all
naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of
the amendment.”).
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Carlson, supra note 36, at 955.
88. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
89. See generally Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 (1879). See also Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900) (“Whenever by any
action of a state, whether through its legislature, through its courts, or through its executive
or administrative officers, all persons of the African race are excluded, solely because of
their race or color, from serving as grand jurors in the criminal prosecution of a person of the
African race, the equal protection of the laws is denied.”).
90. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950).
91. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (holding that the constitutional
prohibition of intentional exclusion from a jury is not limited to African Americans but also
applies to all other ethnic groups).
92. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
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While these cases prohibited the exclusion of citizens from jury service
based on race, it was not until its 1965 decision in Swain v. Alabama, 93 that
the Supreme Court considered whether a prosecutor’s racially
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 94 In this case, the defendant moved to void the petit jury95
that convicted him of rape based on “alleged invidious discrimination in the
selection of jurors.” 96 Supporting the defendant’s contention was evidence
that, of the eight black jurors on the petit venire, two were exempt and the
other six peremptorily dismissed by the prosecutor. 97 Moreover, the record
indicated that while blacks were often called to sit on the venire, no black
citizen had actually served on a Talladega jury since 1950. 98
Evaluating the evidence with the presumption that a prosecutor uses
peremptory challenges “to obtain a fair and impartial jury,”99 the Court
determined that the evidence in this case fell short of proving “the
prosecutor . . . in case after case, whatever the circumstances, . . . [was]
responsible for the removal of [African Americans] who [had] been selected
as qualified jurors.” 100 While the defendant demonstrated that in his own
case the prosecutor exercised peremptory strikes to exclude blacks from the
jury, the record did not evince how the prosecutor had used the challenges
in the past. 101 The Court reasoned that the record was “absolutely silent” as
to which past instances of exclusion were facilitated by the prosecutor
alone. 102 Apparently, in some cases, the prosecution agreed with
defendants to remove blacks from the jury. 103 Absent such a showing, the
Court deemed the evidence insufficient to establish, prima facie, that the
state applied peremptory challenges in order to systematically exclude
jurors based on race. 104
Quite consistent with the Supreme Court’s pre-Batson focus on the
integrity of the peremptory challenge regime, 105 this case provided an
“illusory hope . . . [of] racial parity.” 106 The possibility of meaningfully
challenging a racially discriminatory peremptory strike was essentially
negated by the absence of state records detailing prosecutors’ use of

93. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
94. Id. at 209.
95. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 987 (10th ed. 2014) (“A jury, (usually consisting of 6
or twelve persons) summoned and empaneled in the trial of a specific case.”).
96. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203.
97. Id. at 205.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 222.
100. Id. at 234, 223.
101. Id. at 224.
102. Id. 224–25.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 226–27 (explaining that without a detailed record the state could not
effectively rebut allegations of discrimination).
105. See id. at 222 (noting that “[a]ny other result . . . would establish a rule wholly at
odds with peremptory challenge system”).
106. Carlson, supra note 36, at 956; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986)
(“[Swain v. Alabama] placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof.”).
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peremptory strikes. 107 This difficulty remained until the Court decided
Batson in 1986. 108
2. Batson v. Kentucky: A Shift in the Supreme Court’s Focus
Prior to its decision in Batson, and as early as Strauder, the Supreme
Court seemed to prioritize a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury over a juror’s Fourteenth Amendment protection against
discrimination. 109 The Court’s landmark 1986 decision in Batson marked a
shift in the Court’s focus and demonstrated a greater concern for protecting
jurors from discrimination. 110
In Batson, the Supreme Court reconsidered the evidentiary burden Swain
placed on criminal defendants, claiming the prosecutor’s use of peremptory
strikes denied them equal protection. 111 In this case, the petitioner, a black
man convicted of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods,
challenged the prosecutor’s peremptory removal of the only four black
jurors on the venire. 112 Overruling Swain, 113 the Court held that “a
defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in
selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s
exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s [own] trial.” 114 The
decision emphasized that peremptorily excusing a prospective juror based
on his or her race was injurious to the defendant and the excluded juror, but
also to the public, as it undermined its confidence in the justice system. 115

107. Carlson, supra note 36, at 956 (“[Swain’s] standard negated any effective challenge
to the use of racially motivated peremptory strikes because few states even kept records of
how peremptory challenges were used by prosecutors.”).
108. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (reconsidering the evidentiary burden on criminal
defendants).
109. See, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. at 222 (recognizing that racially discriminatory exercise of
peremptory challenges was against the Fourteenth Amendment, but imposing a nearly
insurmountable burden of proving a prima facie case in order to preserve the purpose of
peremptory challenges); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879) (framing the
issue in terms of a criminal defendant’s right to an impartial jury “impanelled without
discrimination” and not in terms of a juror’s right not to be discriminated against).
110. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
111. Id. at 82. The jury occupies a central position in the justice system, “safeguarding a
person accused of crime against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge.” Id.
at 86. A discriminatorily chosen jury, therefore, would violate a defendant’s right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to “protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.” Id.
at 87 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309).
112. Id. at 82–83.
113. See Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More
Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 1075, 1086 n.48 (2011) (explaining that the Batson opinion framed its holding as a
modification and not a repudiation of Swain, even though the majority reached “precisely the
opposite conclusion as Swain”); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 n.25 (“To the extent
anything in [Swain] is contrary to the principles we articulate today, that decision is
overruled.”); id. at 100 (White, J., concurring) (“The Court overturns the principal holding in
Swain.”).
114. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (majority opinion).
115. See id. at 87 (“The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection
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The real challenge the Court faced was not articulating the constitutional
prohibition against race-based peremptory strikes. 116 Rather it was the
“daunting task of fashioning a mechanism to enforce that prohibition” that
presented the biggest challenge. 117 The Court crafted a three-step
procedure when a party challenges an opponent’s peremptory strike as one
based on racial discrimination. 118 These three steps have evolved over
time.
Batson’s first step required a defendant to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. 119 To do so, the defendant needed to establish that he was
part of a cognizable racial group 120 and that the prosecutor exercised
peremptory challenges to remove venireman of defendant’s race from the
jury. 121 Then, the defendant also was required to show that the
circumstances of the challenged peremptory strikes raised an inference that
the prosecutor excluded venireman based on their race. 122 To determine
whether this preliminary inference of purposeful discrimination existed, the
trial court was instructed to “consider all relevant circumstances.” 123
If the defendant successfully established a prima facie case, the burden
would shift to the state to provide a neutral explanation for having
challenged the black jurors. 124 The state did not have to justify the exercise
of a for-cause challenge. 125 Rather, the prosecutor only had to furnish an
explanation that did not violate Equal Protection guarantees. 126 Namely,
the prosecutor could not justify the peremptory challenge on the assumption
or intuition that the jurors would not be impartial because they were of the
same race as the defendant. 127 Should the prosecutor fail to furnish a race-

procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence
in the fairness of our system of justice.”).
116. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1086. The Court reiterated the repeatedly
articulated principle that “the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge
potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a
group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.” Id.
(quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 89).
117. Id. Creating this mechanism was particularly difficult because the Court rejected
Justice Marshall’s “relatively clean” suggestion of abolishing the peremptory challenge all
together. Id. at 1086–87.
118. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98.
119. Id. at 96.
120. Id. (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 97.
123. Id. at 96. The Court listed two examples of evidence that tends to prove purposeful
discrimination. Id. at 97. First, a pattern of strikes against black jurors may give rise to a
preliminary inference of discrimination. Id. Moreover, the prosecutor’s “questions and
statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or
refute an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Id. But ultimately, the Court demonstrated
confidence that trial judges were experienced enough to decide whether the circumstances of
a particular case established prima facie case of discrimination against a black veniremen. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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neutral explanation for its peremptory challenge, the defendant’s conviction
would be reversed. 128
Kentucky objected to the Court’s framework, positing that it would
“eviscerate the fair trial values served by the peremptory challenge.”129
The Court pointed out, however, that, while it is an important trial
procedure, the right to peremptory challenges is not one guaranteed by the
Constitution. 130 The Court further characterized its opinion as one that
“enforce[d] the mandate of equal protection and further[ed] the ends of
justice.” 131
Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, agreed that the majority
“cogently explain[ed] the pernicious nature of the racially discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges.” 132 He did not, however, have as much faith
in its designed solution, stating: “The decision today will not end the racial
discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That
goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges
entirely.” 133
Despite Justice Marshall’s misgivings, the Court has relied on Batson to
craft its later limitations on peremptory strikes. 134 In its expansion of
Batson, the Court has also significantly altered the framework designed in
the 1986 decision. 135
3. The Supreme Court’s Expansion of Batson Beyond Its Original Purpose
Since Batson was decided in 1986, the Court has imposed more
expansive limitations on the exercise of peremptory challenges. 136
Batson’s holding was originally limited to the discriminatory peremptory
challenges exercised by prosecutors in criminal cases where the juror was
the same race as the defendant. 137 Since its decision in Batson, the
Supreme Court has extended its rationale far beyond those original
bounds. 138
Powers v. Ohio 139 was the first case to broaden the application of
Batson’s rule. There the Court held that a race-based exclusion of a juror is
prohibited, even when the potential juror and the defendant are not of a

128. Id. at 100.
129. Id. at 98.
130. Id. at 98–99.
131. Id. at 99.
132. Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 102–03.
134. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
135. See infra Part I.B.4.
136. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 127; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
137. David Smith & Rachel Dennehy, Controversy over the Peremptory Challenge:
Should Batson Be Expanded?, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 453, 461 (1995).
138. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142–43 (extending Batson to prohibit gender-based
peremptory strikes); Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 (extending Batson’s application to cases where
defendant and stricken juror were not of the same race).
139. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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common race. 140 The petitioner was a white defendant objecting to the
exclusion of black veniremen. 141 While the state argued that the petitioner
was precluded from objecting to the peremptory dismissals under Batson,
because he was not of the same race as the excluded jurors, the Court
ultimately disagreed. Essentially, criminal defendants were afforded “thirdparty standing” 142 to challenge a violation of a juror’s equal protection
rights. 143
The Supreme Court further broadened Batson’s application in the years
following Powers. 144 Until 1991, the Supreme Court had only considered
whether the discriminatory peremptory strikes of a prosecutor, a recognized
state actor, violated the Equal Protection Clause. 145 In Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 146 by contrast, the Court considered whether
litigants in civil cases could exercise discriminatory peremptory
challenges. 147 First, the Court concluded that the selection of jurors serves
an important function of the government and attorneys act with substantial
assistance of the court. 148 Furthermore, should civil veniremen be
subjected to discrimination, “[t]he injury to excluded jurors would be the
direct result of governmental delegation and participation.” 149 Thus, during
voir dire proceedings, the exercise of peremptory challenges is “pursuant to
a course of state action.” 150 The Court further reasoned that, regardless of
whether a trial is criminal or civil, a challenged juror’s equal protection
rights are violated when they are peremptorily dismissed based on race. 151
140. Id. at 413 (stating that “a criminal defendant suffers real injury when the prosecutor
excludes jurors . . . on account of race”).
141. Id. at 406.
142. See id. at 410. The Court engaged in a three-part analysis to determine whether a
criminal defendant could be afforded third-party standing on behalf of a juror. See id. at
410–11. It found that voir dire proceedings permit a party to establish a very close
relationship, “if not a bond of trust,” with the veniremen. Id. at 413. It also found that this
relationship is maintained throughout the trial and, in some cases, through sentencing. Id.
Furthermore, the congruent interest criminal defendants and jurors have in “eliminating
racial discrimination from the courtroom,” according to the Court, makes it “necessary and
appropriate” for the defendant to have third-party standing. Id. at 413–14. Lastly, the Court
determined that, while improperly excluded jurors have a right to bring suit on their own
behalf, these challenges would necessarily be rare. See id. at 414. Coupled with the financial
burden at trial and the likely small financial stake, jurors would rarely, if ever, bring such
action. See id.
143. Id. at 416.
144. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
145. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 50 (“Until Edmonson, the cases decided by this Court that
presented the problem of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges involved assertions
of discrimination by a prosecutor . . . .”).
146. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
147. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621–22 (considering (1) “the extent to which the actor relies
on governmental assistance and benefits;” (2) “whether the actor is performing a traditional
governmental function;” and (3) “whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by
the incidents of governmental authority”).
148. Id. at 628.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 622.
151. Id. at 628.
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Accordingly, the Court held that civil litigants may not exercise racially
motivated peremptory strikes. 152
In its 1992 decision in Georgia v. McCollum, 153 relying heavily on its
analysis in Edmonson, the Court considered whether criminal defendants
were permitted to peremptorily strike jurors based on race.154 The Court
predictably concluded that criminal defendants were state actors subject to
the same limitations as prosecutors and civil litigants under the Equal
Protection Clause. 155 Accordingly, the Court further broadened Batson’s
scope and reaffirmed its post-Swain commitment to protecting jurors from
discrimination, stating, “‘if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a
jury panel as fair,’ we reaffirm today that such a ‘price is too high to meet
the standard of the Constitution.’” 156
The Court’s final expansion of Batson occurred in J.E.B. v. Alabama, 157
when it prohibited peremptory challenges based on gender. 158 The
respondent in J.E.B. used nine of her ten peremptory challenges to exclude
men from the venire, resulting in an exclusively female jury. 159 The
petitioner challenged the use of these strikes as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 160 Outlining the history of discrimination against
women in the United States, the Court reasoned that “the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or
on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case for
no reason other than the fact that the person happens to be a woman or
happens to be a man.” 161 The Court further elaborated that similar to race
the guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause, “ensuring citizens that their
State will not discriminate,” would be meaningless if the Court were to
permit gender-based peremptory exclusion. 162
4. The Post-Expansion Batson Inquiry
As its rationale has been extended, the Batson inquiry designed by the
Supreme Court has been altered and more thoroughly defined. Entirely
eliminating the first requirement of the prima facie case defined in
152. Id.
153. 505 U.S. 42 (1992). The Court considered four questions:
First, whether a criminal defendant’s exercise of peremptory challenges in a
racially discriminatory manner inflicts the harms addressed by Batson. Second,
whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant constitutes
state action. Third, whether prosecutors have standing to raise this constitutional
challenge. And fourth, whether the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant
nonetheless preclude the extension of our precedents to this case.
Id. at 48.
154. Id. at 44.
155. Id. at 59.
156. Id. at 57 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)).
157. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
158. Id. at 146.
159. Id. at 129.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 146.
162. Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97–98 (1986)).
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Batson, 163 trial courts today begin a Batson hearing by determining whether
“the totality of the relevant facts” sufficiently establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination. 164 “Indicia of a prima facie case might include
the ‘pattern’ of strikes, counsel’s ‘questions and statements during voir
dire,’ as well as ‘racial identity between the defendant and the excused
prospective juror.’” 165
If a trial judge determines that a prima facie case of discrimination has
been made, the burden of production shifts to the party who executed the
strike to offer a race-neutral 166 or gender-neutral 167 explanation. An
explanation is not neutral if it is based on an assumption that members of a
particular race or gender are likely to hold certain views or be biased in a
certain way. 168 Moreover, a “legitimate reason” for a peremptory challenge
is not one that simply makes logical sense. 169 Rather, it is one that does not
deny equal protection guarantees. 170 In fact, this second step is concerned
only with the “facial validity” of a party’s explanation. 171 Thus, any
justification will be deemed neutral unless “a discriminatory intent is
inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation.” 172
The third and final step of a Batson inquiry requires the trial court to
evaluate the plausibility and “persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s
justification for his peremptory strike.” 173 The very point of a peremptory
strike is that a party’s motivation for the challenge remains unspoken.174
163. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (holding that defendant does not have
to be of the same race as excluded juror in order to raise a Batson challenge).
164. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94; see Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005) (“[A]
defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to
permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”).
165. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1087 (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 416;
Edmonsville v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991)).
166. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995).
167. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 144–45 (1994) (requiring genderneutral explanation for peremptory challenge if prima facie case of intentional discrimination
based on juror’s gender is established).
168. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (holding that a reason is not legitimate if it “arise[s] solely
from the juror’s race”).
169. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768–69.
170. Id. at 769.
171. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1866).
172. Id. Some examples of accepted neutral explanations include: “[n]ot smart enough
to serve on the jury,” “[d]ressed like a 15-year-old, with baggy clothes,” “[n]ot mature
enough,” “single.” Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1091.
Our survey reveals that in a broad array of cases . . . attorneys articulate and judges
accept “race-neutral” explanations for peremptory strikes that either highly
correlate with race or are silly, trivial, or irrelevant to the case. Reviewing courts
then affirm these determinations. This is significant because if attorneys can avoid
Batson in this manner, there are only two narrow circumstances in which a Batson
challenge is likely to succeed: (1) where an attorney admits to a racial motivation
and (2) where an attorney’s explanation applies to a virtually identical juror of a
different race who was not stricken. . . . [T]hese two scenarios in which Batson
will likely smoke out a racially discriminatory strike are exceedingly unlikely.
Id. at 1102.
173. Id. at 1088 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338–39 (2003)).
174. Babcock, supra note 29, at 553–55.
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Thus, most often there is little evidence for the trial court to rely on when
deciding this issue other than “the demeanor of the attorney who exercises
The trial court essentially makes a fact-based
the challenge.” 175
determination whether the prosecutor’s explanation is credible. 176 The
Supreme Court also has mandated that the trial court be afforded great
deference of its third-step determination. 177 This is practically justified by
the “necessarily fact intensive” Batson review. 178 Consider, many of the
critical facts relied on by the trial court, such as the attorney’s demeanor,
will not be readily apparent on the appellate record.179
C. Drawing the Line: The Fate of Peremptory Strikes in the Wake of
Supreme Court Equal Protection Jurisprudence
In J.E.B. v. Alabama, after expanding Batson a final time, the Supreme
Court iterated that its holding did not “imply the elimination of all
peremptory challenges.” 180 It clearly explained that parties can exercise
peremptory challenges to remove any “group or class of individuals
normally subject to ‘rational basis’ review” 181 under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. With this, the Court drew a line in
the sand. A Batson challenge cannot be sustained unless the juror stricken
from the venire is a member of a class entitled to something more than
“rational basis review.” 182 Part I.C.1. defines rational basis review and
discusses the Supreme Court’s three-tiered system of judicial review. Part
I.C.2. examines how the Court determines whether a classification is
entitled to more than mere rational basis review.
1. The Three-Tiered System of Judicial Review
Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Ordinarily, a classification is constitutional if it passes rational basis
review, 183 the most lenient form of judicial review. 184 A court will
consider a law subject to rational basis review with a “presumption of
constitutionality,” and uphold it if the challenged law is “rationally related”
175. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.
176. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986) (“[T]he trial judge’s findings in the
context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility . . . .” (quoting
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575–76 (1985))). The credibility determination
considers, among other things, the party’s demeanor, the reasonableness or improbability of
the offered explanation, and whether the explanation has “some basis in accepted trial
strategy.” Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1088 (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339).
177. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1089.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).
181. Id.
182. Id.; see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 479–80 (9th
Cir. 2014).
183. Roberta A. Kaplan & Julie E. Fink, The Defense of Marriage Act: The Application
of Heightened Scrutiny to Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 2012 CARDOZO
L. REV. 203, 205–06.
184. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
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to a “legitimate government interest.”185 This standard of review is applied
in all cases where no fundamental right or suspect classification is at
issue. 186 For example, laws that discriminate on the basis of mental
disability or age are reviewed under this lenient standard. 187
Some legislative classifications are subject to “a more exacting type of
heightened scrutiny,” if they burden a quasi-suspect 188 or suspect 189 class:
Such classifications are appropriately treated by the courts with extreme
skepticism, because there is a particularly high risk that the law was
designed for an improper purpose. In other words, the assumption in
those situations is that the legislature should not be in the business of
passing laws that treat these groups differently than others. 190

Intermediate scrutiny, at issue in J.E.B., is the middle tier of judicial
review applied in cases involving quasi-suspect classifications. 191 In order
for a classification to be sustained under intermediate scrutiny, the law must
further an important government interest by means that are substantially
related to that interest.192
The most rigorous strict scrutiny standard is applied in cases involving
suspect classifications such as race. 193 To pass strict scrutiny, the
legislature must have passed the law to further a “compelling governmental
interest,” and must have narrowly crafted the rule to achieve that goal. 194 A
court applies strict scrutiny if the government significantly abridges a
fundamental right with the law’s enactment or passes a law that involves a
suspect classification. 195 Suspect classifications include race, national
origin, and alienage. 196
Under the heightened scrutiny standards, “a tenable justification must
describe actual stated purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact
differently grounded.” 197 Stated differently, a state actor cannot defend a
classification based on the “hypothetical justifications” welcomed under
rational basis review. 198 Accordingly, in most equal protection analyses,
the “primary, and often determinative, question” concerns the level of
scrutiny to be applied and whether the classification involved should be
treated as suspect or non-suspect. 199

185. Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 205.
186. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
187. See Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 205.
188. Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 313 (D. Conn. 2012)
(recognizing that gender and illegitimate children are quasi-suspect classes).
189. Id. (identifying race, national ancestry, and ethnic origin as suspect classes).
190. Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 205.
191. See Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 298, 313.
194. Id. at 310.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 313.
197. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535–36 (1996).
198. Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 206.
199. Id.
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2. Defining Suspect and Quasi-Suspect Classifications
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court developed a test for
determining whether a particular group is entitled to the application of
heightened scrutiny. 200 This test contemplates four factors. 201 First, it
considers whether the group in question has suffered a history of
discrimination. 202 Second, it inquires as to whether the group-defining
characteristic has any relation to an individual’s ability to perform or
contribute to society. 203 Third, it considers whether the group exhibits
“obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a
discrete group.” 204 Last, the test accounts for whether the group is a
numerical minority or politically powerless. 205
When applying this test, there is no single factor that is dispositive.206
Any one of the four factors may signal to the court that a classification,
“provides no sensible ground for differential treatment” 207 or is “more
likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative
rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.”208 The Court has given
particular consideration to whether a group has been subjected to a history
of discrimination, as well as whether the distinguishable characteristics of a
group bear any relation to its ability to perform or contribute to society. 209
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: DOES THE BATSON REGIME PROHIBIT OR PERMIT
SEXUAL ORIENTATION–BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES?
When the Supreme Court decided J.E.B., it made very clear that the
expansion of Batson’s reach was not intended to entirely abdicate the
peremptory challenge’s effect.210 In order for this intention to be
practicable, it was necessary to draw a line in the sand. At the time, the
Court decided that this line would be drawn based on the level of judicial
review the Court would apply when reviewing different classifications
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 211 Therefore, whether a peremptory
challenge based on sexual orientation is eligible for Batson protection
depends entirely on the level of scrutiny a court applies on review. 212
200. See id.
201. See John Nicodemo, Homosexuals, Equal Protection, and the Guarantee of
Fundamental Rights in the New Decade: An Optimist’s Quasi-Suspect View of Recent
Events and Their Impact on Heightened Scrutiny for Sexual Orientation–Based
Discrimination, 28 TOURO L. REV. 285, 292–97 (2012).
202. See id. at 292–93.
203. See Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 206.
204. Id.
205. See Nicodemo, supra note 201, at 296–97.
206. See Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 206.
207. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
208. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
209. Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); Kaplan & Fink, supra
note 183, at 206.
210. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).
211. Id.
212. See id.
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Part II of this Note discusses the federal circuit courts’ diverse treatment
of classifications based on sexual orientation and the resulting circuit split
regarding the eligibility of jurors to receive Batson protection against
peremptory challenges motivated by sexual orientation. Part II.A examines
three Supreme Court cases reviewing the constitutionality of classifications
based on sexual orientation. Part II.B analyzes the position that heightened
scrutiny is applied to classifications based on sexual orientation, and
therefore, Batson may be extended to prohibit peremptory strikes based on
sexual orientation. In contrast, Part II.C dissects the opposite position that
classifications based on sexual orientation are entitled only to rational basis
review, and thus, peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation remain
permissible.
A. The Supreme Court’s Review of Classifications
Based on Sexual Orientation Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court has decided three cases concerning classifications
based on sexual orientation which involved, at least in part, an analysis
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause: Romer v.
Evans, 213 Lawrence v. Texas, 214 and Windsor v. United States.215 The
current circuit split, regarding which level of scrutiny must be applied when
reviewing classifications based on sexual orientation, largely is based on
how these cases have been, and are being, interpreted. 216
1. Romer v. Evans
In its 1996 decision in Romer, the Supreme Court first addressed sexual
orientation discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. 217 In this
case, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution, which prohibited all legislative, executive, and
judicial action designed to protect homosexuals. 218 The Court specifically
articulated its application of rational basis review219 and explained the
213. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
214. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
215. Windsor v. United States (Windsor III), 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
216. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 480, 484 (9th
Cir. 2014) (interpreting Windsor III to indicate homosexuals are entitled to heightened
scrutiny). But see, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 414 (6th Cir. 2014) (interpreting
Windsor III as a decision about federalism, not heightened scrutiny).
217. The Supreme Court previously reviewed sexual orientation discrimination under the
Due Process Clause in Bowers v. Hardwick. See 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In that case,
respondent challenged the constitutionality of a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy. See
id. at 187–88. The Court found that there was no fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy as such a right was not “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that
‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.’” Id. at 191–92 (quoting Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)).
218. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623. This amendment was passed in response to several
Colorado municipalities’ prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination in realms of public
and private housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and
welfare services. Id.
219. Id. at 631–32.
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deferential test: “In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be
said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems
unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale
The Court found that Amendment 2
for it seems tenuous.” 220
“confound[ed]” even this deferential standard for two reasons. 221
First, the Court explained, Amendment 2 denied “equal protection of the
laws in the most literal sense.” 222 It imposed a “broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group” 223 and was, simultaneously, “too
narrow and too broad.” 224 It was a type of legislation simply not supported
by “our constitutional tradition,” making it more difficult for a specific
group to obtain help from its government. 225
Second, the Court concluded that Colorado did not have a legitimate
interest in enacting Amendment 2. 226 The Court not only rejected the
state’s proffered interests, 227 but also determined that the harm Amendment
2 inflicted on homosexuals “outr[an] and belie[d]” any legitimate interest
that could justify its enactment. 228 The Court, instead, succumbed to the
“inevitable inference,” that the law was motivated by animus toward
homosexuals, 229 and concluded that Amendment 2 did not further a
legitimate end but rather sought to make homosexuals unequal to everyone
else. 230 Notably, the Court did not address whether homosexuals
constituted a quasi-suspect or suspect class. 231
2. Lawrence v. Texas
Seven years after Romer, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional
legitimacy of a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy in
Lawrence. 232 While it ultimately struck down the statute under the Due
Process Clause, the Court superficially reviewed its legitimacy under the
Equal Protection Clause. 233 The majority concluded that, while Romer
potentially provided a basis for striking down the statute under the Equal

220. Id. at 632.
221. Id. at 633.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 632.
224. Id. at 633.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 634–35.
227. See id. at 635 (noting that Colorado cited “respect for other citizens’ freedom of
association,” “liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections
to homosexuality,” and “conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups”
as its purposes for passing Amendment 2). The Court discredited these explanations because
“[t]he breadth of the amendment [was] so far removed from these particular justifications.”
Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 634–35 (“[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that
the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”).
230. Id. at 635.
231. See generally id.
232. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
233. See id. at 574–75.
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Protection Clause, the case required the Court to evaluate the “continuing
validity” of Bowers v. Hardwick. 234
In her concurring opinion, however, Justice O’Connor explicitly found
the Texas statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.235
She did so applying a “more searching form of rational basis review” that
was justified by the statute’s “desire to harm a politically unpopular
group.” 236 Rearticulating the principles set forth in Romer, she stated,
“[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is
an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
Equal Protection Clause.” 237
3. Windsor III
Most recently, the Supreme Court reviewed a Second Circuit decision238
striking down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act 239 (DOMA). The
plaintiff, Edith Windsor, married her wife in Canada and subsequently
resided in New York. 240 Upon her wife’s death, Windsor was denied the
benefit of a spousal deduction of federal estate taxes because DOMA’s
definitions of “marriage” and “spouse” precluded the Internal Revenue
Service from “recognizing Windsor as a spouse or the [same-sex] couple as
married.” 241 The Court concluded that since DOMA sought to injure the
“very class New York [sought] to protect,” it violated both due process and
equal protection principles. 242 In doing so, however, the Court neither
articulated the standard of review it was applying, 243 nor, as in Romer, 244
did it address whether homosexuals constituted a quasi-suspect or suspect
class. 245

234. Id. The Court ultimately concluded that the statute “further[ed] no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”
Id. at 578.
235. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 580.
237. Id. at 582.
238. See infra Part II.B.1.a (discussing “Windsor II”).
239. The Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) (“In determining the meaning of
any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
240. Windsor v. United States (Windsor II), 699 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 2012).
241. Id.
242. Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“The Constitution’s guarantee of equality
‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group. In determining whether a law is
motived by an improper animus or purpose, ‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’
especially require careful consideration. DOMA cannot survive under these principles.”).
243. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 480 (9th Cir. 2014)
(noting that the Court in Windsor III “did not expressly announce the level of scrutiny it
applied to the equal protection claim at issue”).
244. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
245. See Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Court paid much attention to DOMA’s purpose and effect. 246 It
determined that DOMA’s “unusual deviation” from the practice of
recognizing state definitions of marriage was “strong evidence” that the
purpose and effect of the law was to “impose a disadvantage, a separate
status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.” 247 Moreover, the Court
reasoned that DOMA’s “operation in practice” further evidenced this
purpose. 248
Ultimately, the Court concluded that DOMA was invalid under the Fifth
Amendment. 249 It held that no legitimate purpose “[overcame] the purpose
and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage
laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.” 250
B. A New Quasi-Suspect Class: Batson May Prohibit
Sexual Orientation–Based Strikes
The Second and Ninth Circuits have decided that classifications based on
sexual orientation require the application of heightened scrutiny. Part II.B.1
assesses cases holding that heightened scrutiny applies when reviewing
laws that classify based on sexual orientation. Part II.B.2 discusses the
possibility of prohibiting peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation in
circuits where such classifications are reviewed with heightened scrutiny,
and the Ninth Circuit’s express decision to do so.
1. Homosexuals Are a Quasi-Suspect Class
Entitled to Heightened Scrutiny
In 2012, the Second Circuit became the first circuit to hold that
heightened scrutiny applies to classifications based on sexual orientation.
In 2014, the Ninth Circuit followed suit.

246. Id. at 2693–94 (majority opinion).
247. Id. at 2693. The Court indicated that Congress’s stated purpose was to promote “an
interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage
laws.” Id. Furthermore, the Court adopted the argument that the Act’s demonstrated purpose
was to “ensure that if any State decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will
be treated as second-class marriages for the purposes of federal law.” Id. at 2693–94.
“DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code.” Id. at 2694. “DOMA’s
principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal.
The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like governmental
efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of the
person.” Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2696. “The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the
laws.” Id. at 2695 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954)). “While the
Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in the
way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that
Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved.” Id.
250. Id. at 2696.

2022

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

a. The Second Circuit Applies Heightened Scrutiny
to Review the Defense of Marriage Act: Windsor II
In its 2012 case, Windsor II, 251 the Second Circuit considered whether a
review of the constitutionality of Section Three of DOMA necessitated the
application of heightened scrutiny. 252
The Second Circuit first recognized that several courts have read
Supreme Court precedent as demanding the application of a more searching
rational basis review when there are “historic patterns of disadvantage
suffered by the group adversely affected by the statute.” 253 It further stated,
however, that the Supreme Court has never “expressly sanctioned” such
modification of the rational basis standard. 254 Accepting that there is
sufficient “doctrinal instability in this area,” the Second Circuit avoided
deciding which level of rational basis need be applied, as “if heightened
scrutiny is available” no “permutation of rational basis review is
needed.” 255
The court employed the Supreme Court’s four-factor suspect class
inquiry 256 and concluded that its review of Section Three of DOMA
necessitated the application of heightened scrutiny. 257 In applying this test,
the court identified two of the four factors as merely “indicative” and not
determinative of a group’s suspect class status. 258 First, the court doubted
whether there was “much left of the immutability theory.” 259 It cited to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 260 which rejected the
argument that classifications based on alienage did not necessitate the
application of strict scrutiny because alienage is not an immutable
characteristic. 261 Second, it recognized that the political powerlessness of a
group was relevant, but neither necessary (“as the gender cases
demonstrate”) nor sufficient (“as the example of minors illustrates,” 262) to
establish a suspect class. 263 Nevertheless, despite the limited importance of
these two factors, the Second Circuit determined that all four of the test’s
factors justified the application of heightened scrutiny. 264
The court began with an “easy” conclusion that homosexuals have
suffered a history of discrimination, a fact which was “not much in

251. 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012).
252. Id. at 181.
253. Id. at 180 (quoting Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d
1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012)).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 181.
256. See supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text.
257. Windsor II, 699 F.3d at 181.
258. Id.
259. Id. (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.10 (1985)).
260. 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
261. Windsor II, 699 F.3d at 181 (citing Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 9 n.11).
262. Id. (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 181–82.

2015]

NARROWING AND EXPANDING BATSON

2023

debate.” 265 Looking only as far as the criminalization of homosexual
activity in several states to find “telling proof of animus and discrimination
against homosexuals,” the court quickly dismissed arguments that this
history was insufficient to warrant the application of heightened scrutiny.266
While it recognized that unlike racial minorities and women homosexuals
have never been politically disenfranchised, Supreme Court precedent
precluded this difference from being decisive. 267 Moreover, the short
history of discrimination against homosexuals, relative to that against
women and racial minorities, did not avert the application of the heightened
standard. 268 Rather, in accordance with the majority of cases having
“meaningfully considered the question,” the court found the ninety years of
discrimination against homosexuals, beginning in the 1920s, sufficient to
satisfy the “history of discrimination” factor. 269
With similar “ease,” the court concluded that homosexuality is a
characteristic bearing no relation to the “ability to perform or contribute to
society.” 270 There are some characteristics, such as age or mental handicap,
which “may arguably inhibit an individual’s ability to contribute to
society.” 271 Sexual orientation, however, is not among them. 272 Quite
oppositely, the court indicated, “[t]he aversion homosexuals experience”
bears absolutely no relation to aptitude or performance. 273
The Second Circuit further concluded that homosexuality is a
“sufficiently discernible characteristic to define a discrete minority
class.” 274 It rejected the argument that a defining characteristic must be
both obvious and immutable. 275 Instead, the court interpreted the test more
broadly as whether there are “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics” that define the discrete group.276 Furthermore, the court
indicated that whether a group-defining characteristic is obvious is not
important. 277 Rather the relevant inquiry is whether, when manifest, the

265. Id. at 182.
266. Id.
267. Id. (applying intermediate scrutiny in cases involving classifications based on
illegitimacy even though children born out of wedlock were never disenfranchised (citing
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978)).
268. Id. (“[W]hether such discrimination existed in Babylon is neither here nor there.”).
269. Id. (citing Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (D. Conn.
2012)).
270. Id. (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 182–83.
274. Id. at 183.
275. Id. (“Classifications based on alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin are all
subject to heightened scrutiny, even though these characteristics do not declare themselves,
and often may be disclosed or suppressed as a matter of preference. What seems to matter is
whether the characteristic of the class calls down discrimination when it is manifest.”).
276. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)).
277. Id.
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characteristic invites discrimination.278 Homosexuality, the court reasoned,
is a sufficiently distinguishing characteristic in this way. 279
Contemplating the last factor of the suspect class test, the court indicated
that homosexuals did not have the power to protect themselves against
“discrimination at the hands of the majoritarian political process.”280
Recognizing the difficulty in determining whether homosexuals are actually
underrepresented in the government, the court was instead persuaded by the
small number of “acknowledged homosexuals” in positions of power and
authority. 281 The two posited explanations for this small number—hostility
which excludes homosexuals from these positions or, alternatively, hostility
which motivates homosexuals to keep their sexual orientation private—
were just as dispositive to the court as a statistical underrepresentation
would have been. 282 Furthermore, the court posited that these same
hostilities would surely suppress at least some political activity by
stigmatizing the open association with certain political agendas.283
Ultimately, the analysis of these four factors led the court to define
homosexuals as a quasi-suspect class entitled to intermediate scrutiny under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 284
b. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision to Apply Heightened Scrutiny
to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation:
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories
The Ninth Circuit, in Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 285 specifically considered whether peremptory strikes could
be exercised on the basis of sexual orientation. 286 In the lower court, the
plaintiff brought an action alleging that the manufacturer of an HIV drug
violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and antitrust
laws. 287 During voir dire, the defendant used its first peremptory challenge
to remove the only self-identified gay juror from the venire. 288 The
plaintiff responded with a Batson challenge, alleging that the defendant’s
peremptory strike was motivated by the juror’s sexual orientation. 289 The
trial judge rejected the Batson challenge, expressing doubt as to whether
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 184.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 184–85 (stating that actual underrepresentation of homosexuals in positions of
authority and power and hostility which causes the appearance of such “amounts to much the
same thing”).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 185. The mistreatment suffered by homosexuals “is not sufficient to require
‘our most exacting scrutiny.’” Id. (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977)).
285. 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
286. Id. at 474.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 474–75.
289. Id. at 475. Counsel for plaintiff cited the involvement of AIDS medication in the
litigation as the suspected motivation for the peremptory strike by the defendant. Id.
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Batson applied to sexual orientation–based peremptory challenges, and the
plaintiff subsequently appealed. 290
The Ninth Circuit, relying on the line drawn in J.E.B., reasoned that, if
sexual orientation is a classification subject only to rational basis review,
the lower court’s decision to reject the Batson challenge was
unreviewable. 291 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit began by considering
whether classifications based on sexual orientation are entitled to
heightened scrutiny. 292
In making its determination, the court posited that, since the Supreme
Court failed to articulate the standard of review it applied in Windsor III, it
was necessary to review what the court “actually did.” 293 Three aspects of
the Supreme Court’s Windsor III analysis persuaded the Ninth Circuit that it
engaged in heightened scrutiny. 294
First, the Supreme Court did not entertain possible post hoc
rationalizations for the enactment of Section Three of DOMA.295
Traditionally, laws survive rational basis review “if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify” the classifications imposed by the
law. 296 In Windsor III, the Ninth Circuit explained, the Supreme Court did
not “[conceive] of hypothetical justifications for [DOMA].” 297 Nor did the
Court consider any of the five rational bases offered by the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group in its brief. 298 Instead, the Court relied on DOMA’s
legislative history to evaluate the “essence” of the law and considered its
Moreover, the Court extensively
“design, purpose, and effect.” 299
discussed Congress’s “avowed purpose . . . to impose inequality,” as well as
DOMA’s “demonstrated purpose” to support its conclusion that Section
Three of DOMA was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. 300 This
consideration of Congress’s actual purpose and the failure to consider
hypothetical rational bases, according to the Ninth Circuit, “is antithetical to
the very concept of rational basis review.” 301

290. Id.
291. Id. at 479–80.
292. Id. at 480.
293. Id. (explaining that when the Supreme Court has refrained from identifying its
method of analysis, the Ninth Circuit analyzes the Supreme Court precedent, “by considering
what the Court actually did, rather than by dissecting isolated pieces of text” (quoting Witt v.
Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008))).
294. Id. The Ninth Circuit considered three factors it previously defined in Witt. First,
whether the Supreme Court considered possible post hoc rationalization for the law, as is
required under rational basis review. Id. Second, whether the Court required that the state
interest in its action be “legitimate” as the Ninth Circuit stated is “traditionally the case in
heightened scrutiny.” Id. And finally, whether heightened scrutiny was applied in the cases
relied upon by the Court. Id. at 480–81.
295. Id. at 481.
296. Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 481–82.
299. Id. at 481 (quoting Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683, 2689 (2013)).
300. Id. at 482.
301. Id.
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Second, the Supreme Court deemed Congress’s interest in enacting
Section Three legitimate. 302 More than that, however, the Court demanded
that this legitimate purpose “justify disparate treatment of the group.” 303
Were the Court applying rational basis review, the Ninth Circuit concluded,
it would not have identified a legitimate interest in order to “justify” the
classification. 304 Rational basis, contrastingly, is “unconcerned with the
inequality that results from the challenged state action.” 305 Yet Windsor III
repeatedly refers to the harm, injury, and effect of DOMA on gays and
lesbians, concluding that no purpose “overcomes” this effect. 306 Moreover,
the majority was concerned with the “public message sent by DOMA about
the status occupied by gays and lesbians in our society,” which tends to
impose second-class status on the group. 307
Absent among all of this concern was the “strong presumption” of
constitutionality and the “extremely deferential posture” typical of rational
basis review. 308 Windsor III’s thorough consideration of DOMA’s actual
purpose, the harm and injury DOMA inflicted on homosexuals, as well as
its balancing of the two, according to the Ninth Circuit, simply do not
comport with traditional rational basis review.309
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit considered what it described as “the least
important factor”: whether Windsor III cited and relied upon cases
employing heightened scrutiny. 310 While the relevant portion of the
Windsor III opinion relies on few cases, 311 the Ninth Circuit found that the
Court relied both on rational basis and heightened scrutiny cases. 312 Thus,
while the Court’s reliance was not decisive, it tended to support the
application of heightened scrutiny. 313
Thus, applying the Witt test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Windsor III
compelled the application of heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases
This
involving classifications based on sexual orientation. 314

302. Id.
303. Id. (quoting Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. at 2693).
304. Id.
305. Id. (applying the presumption that state legislatures “have acted within their
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.”
(citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961))).
306. Id. at 483 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the
purpose and effect to disparage and injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws,
sought to protect in personhood and dignity.” (quoting Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. at 2696)).
307. Id. at 482–83.
308. Id. at 483.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. The Court relied on Romer, Lawrence, and Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973). Id. Romer applied rational basis review. Id. According to both the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, Moreno employed “a more searching form of rational
basis review.” Id. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the Lawrence decision in Witt,
led it to conclude that the Court applied heightened scrutiny in that case as well. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 481.
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determination, however, did not similarly compel the prohibition of
peremptory strikes on the basis of sexual orientation. 315
2. Heightened Scrutiny: Necessary But Not Sufficient to Extend Batson
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that “[i]n J.E.B., the Supreme Court did
not state definitively whether heightened scrutiny is sufficient to warrant
Batson’s protection or merely necessary.” 316 Instead, the Court stated,
“parties may . . . exercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the
venire any group or class of individuals normally subject to ‘rational basis’
review.” 317
Analyzing the reasoning and rationale of J.E.B., the Ninth Circuit
prohibited peremptory challenges based on sexual orientation.318 The court
pointed out that J.E.B. “took Batson, a case about the use of race in jury
selection, and applied its principles to discrimination against women.”319
In doing so, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, the Supreme Court recognized that
even groups with a history of discrimination significantly differing from
that of African Americans, may be entitled to the protection of Batson.320
Accordingly, the Court’s articulated purposes in deciding J.E.B. and Batson
were applied, and the history of discrimination experienced by gays and
lesbians independently analyzed, to justify the Ninth Circuit’s prohibition
of sexual orientation–based peremptory strikes. 321
First, the Ninth Circuit recognized that, much like strikes on the basis of
race and gender, peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of sexual
orientation deprive individuals of the right to participate in the judicial
system “on account of a characteristic that has nothing to do with their
fitness to serve.” 322 While homosexuals have not been systematically
excluded from juries in the same open manner as women and African
Americans, the “unique experiences of gays and lesbians,” and the history
of government-endorsed discrimination against them, compel the same
Batson protection. 323 Certainly, homosexuality is not a characteristic
315. Id. at 484.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 484–85.
322. Id. at 485.
323. Id.
In the first half of the twentieth century, public attention was preoccupied with
homosexual “infiltration” of the federal government. Gays and lesbians were
dismissed from civilian employment in the federal government at a rate of sixty
per month. Discrimination in employment was not limited to the federal
government; local and state governments also excluded homosexuals, and
professional licensing boards often revoked licenses on account of homosexuality.
In 1985, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case in which a woman had been
fired from her job as a guidance counselor in a public school because of her
sexuality. Indeed, gays and lesbians were thought to be so contrary to our
conception of citizenship that they were made inadmissible under a provision of
our immigration laws that required the Immigration and Naturalization Service
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obvious on the face of a juror. 324 Until quite recently, 325 however, gays and
lesbians did not identify themselves as such for fear that “being openly gay
[would result] in significant discrimination.” 326 Second, the Ninth Circuit
stated that the Constitution cannot perpetuate the very “state-sponsored
group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice” that lead
to this forced privacy in the first place.327 For all of these reasons, the
Ninth Circuit determined that peremptory strikes based on sexual
orientation must be prohibited under Batson. 328
In the Second Circuit, after Windsor II, homosexuals are no longer a
group “normally subject to rational basis review.” 329 As such, under J.E.B.
they are not a group that automatically can be peremptorily removed from
the venire in courts where Windsor II is binding. 330 While this suggests
that sexual orientation-based strikes may be prohibited in the Second
Circuit, the court has not yet decided the issue.
While the Second and Ninth Circuits are the only two circuit courts to
define homosexuals as a class entitled to heightened scrutiny, several
district courts have decided similarly since then. 331 Several circuits and
district courts, however, have also declined to do so. 332
C. Homosexuals Are Not Entitled to Heightened Scrutiny or Batson
Protection
As the Second Circuit pointed out in Windsor II, there is much “doctrinal
instability” surrounding the issue of the appropriate standard of review to be
applied to classifications based on sexual orientation.333 Only the Second
and Ninth Circuits have expressly decided that homosexuals constitute a
(INS) to exclude individuals “afflicted with psychopathic personality.” It was not
until 1990 that the INS ceased to interpret that category as including gays and
lesbians. It is only recently that gay men and women gained the right to be open
about their sexuality in the course of their military service. As one scholar put it,
throughout the twentieth century, gays and lesbians were the “anticitizen.”
Id. at 484–85.
324. See id. at 485.
325. Id. at 485–86 (“[I]n 1985, only one quarter of Americans reported knowing someone
who was gay. By 2000, this number increased to 75 percent of Americans.”).
326. Id. at 485.
327. Id. at 486 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994)).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 479.
330. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143.
331. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1074–77 (D. Idaho 2014) (relying on
SmithKline when deciding that heightened scrutiny applied to sexual orientation
classifications when it considered a § 1983 action brought by two same-sex couples seeking
to marry in Idaho and two same-sex couples seeking to have their out-of-state marriages
recognized by Idaho); Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d, 1036, 1054 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (using
SmithKline as precedent to apply intermediate scrutiny when invalidating a law prohibiting
the recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions); Wolf v. Walker, 986
F. Supp. 2d 982, 1010 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (agreeing with SmithKline that sexual orientation–
based classifications necessitate the application of heightened scrutiny but not deeming
SmithKline binding precedent).
332. See infra notes 387–91 and accompanying text.
333. Windsor II, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012).
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quasi-suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny. 334 Other circuits apply
rational basis review to such classifications. Part II.C.1 examines
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent inapposite to the Second and
Ninth Circuits’ view, that sexual orientation–based classifications are
entitled to mere rational basis review. Part II.C.2 discusses the ineligibility,
under J.E.B., of sexual orientation–based peremptory strikes to be
prohibited in jurisdictions adopting this view and the arguments against
extending Batson to prohibit such strikes.
1. Sexual Orientation–Based Classifications Are Reviewed
for Rational Basis: DeBoer v. Snyder
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Windsor III, and the opinion that the
Supreme Court in its actions, rather than its words, has been applying
heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation–based classifications, is certainly
not a unanimous one. The Sixth Circuit’s recent interpretation of rational
basis review, as applied to the prohibition of same-sex marriage precipitated
by the Michigan Marriage Amendment (MMA) in DeBoer v. Snyder, 335 is
an appropriate example of just that.
DeBoer reviewed the constitutionality of the voter-approved MMA,
which prohibited same-sex marriage. 336 The court addressed the question
from many different perspectives, considering arguments for and against the
MMA’s validity under theories of “rational basis review; animus; . . . [and]
suspect classificatio[n],” among others. 337 Under no theory, however, did
the court find a reason for “constitutionalizing the definition of marriage
and for removing the issue from the place it has been since the Founding:
in the hands of state voters.” 338
a. Rational Basis Review
The Sixth Circuit began its rational basis analysis by defining the
deference to be effected when applying this standard of review, stating,
“[s]o long as judges can conceive of some ‘plausible’ reason for the law—
any plausible reason, even one that did not motivate the legislators who
enacted it—the law must stand, no matter how unfair, unjust, or unwise the
judges may consider it as citizens.” 339 Ultimately, the court found two such
bases sufficient to meet this “low bar,” 340 the first of which is the
furtherance of a government interest in regulating sex 341 and in creating
334. See supra Part II.B.1.
335. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
336. Id. at 396–97.
337. Id. at 402 (“There are many ways . . . to look at this question: originalism; rational
basis review; animus; fundamental rights; suspect classifications; evolving meaning. The
parties in one way or another have invoked them all.”).
338. Id. at 403.
339. Id. at 404 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330 (1993)).
340. Id.
341. Id. (“One starts from the premise that governments got into the business of defining
marriage, and remain in the business of defining marriage, not to regulate love but to
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stable family units for the creation of children. 342 The court viewed the
MMA as a state-created incentive for a couple to “stay together for
purposes of rearing offspring.” 343 It also held that this legislation is not
irrational, but rather, recognizes the “biological reality” that same-sex
couples do not have children in the same way that heterosexual couples
do. 344 The same risk of unintended offspring, therefore, does not exist. 345
In recognizing this basis, the court also considered a countervailing
policy argument in favor of extending marriage laws to gay couples: gay
couples are no less capable than straight couples of sharing loving,
affectionate, and committed relationships or of raising children and
providing stable families for them. 346 Ultimately, however, the court stated
that the “signature feature” of rational basis review is that legislation will
not be invalidated simply because the government has done too much or too
little in addressing a policy question. 347 Moreover, rational basis review
does not “empower federal courts to ‘subject’ legislative line-drawing to
‘courtroom’ factfinding” which tends to favor a different policy. 348 Nor
can such found facts be the basis of a ruling of unconstitutionality. 349
The second rational basis the Sixth Circuit recognized was a state’s right
to “wait and see” before legislating inapposite to traditional societal
norms. 350 While the plaintiffs argued that the state has acted irrationally in
its continued adoption of the traditional definition of marriage “in the face
of changing social mores,” the court disagreed.351 Eleven years after
Massachusetts recognized gay marriage, “the clock has not run on assessing
the benefits and burdens of expanding the definition of marriage.” 352
Moreover, the court decided, the question of whether maintaining the
traditional definition of marriage is worth its cost is one for the legislature,
not “life-tenured judges.” 353 To further this point, the court concluded its
rational basis analysis by rearticulating its undertaking, stating, “[o]ur task
under the Supreme Court’s precedents is to decide whether the law has

regulate sex, most especially the intended and unintended effects of male-female intercourse.
Imagine a society without marriage. It does not take long to envision problems that might
result from an absence of rules about how to handle the natural effects of male-female
intercourse: children.”).
342. Id. at 404–05 (“People . . . may well need the government’s encouragement to create
and maintain stable relationships within which children may flourish. It is not society’s laws
or for that matter any one religion’s laws . . . [a]nd governments typically are not secondguessed under the Constitution for prioritizing how they tackle such issues.” (citing
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970))).
343. Id. at 405.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. (citing FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 406.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 408.
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some conceivable basis, not to gauge how that rationale stacks up against
the arguments on the other side.” 354
b. Animus
Next, the Sixth Circuit explained the very lack of “traditional deference”
present in cases like Romer and Lawrence and relied upon by the Ninth
Circuit in SmithKline. 355 It posited that the cases in which the Supreme
Court has struck down state laws under rational basis review are those in
which “the novelty of the law and the targeting of a single group for
disfavored treatment” are apparent.356 Distinguishing this case from cases
like Romer and Cleburne, the court pointed out that this law was not
novel. 357 In fact, it codified “a long-existing, widely held social norm
already reflected in state law.” 358 Moreover, quoting Windsor III, the court
pointed out that the heterosexual nature of traditional marriage “had been
thought of by most people as essential to the very definition of that term
and to its role and function throughout the history of civilization.” 359
Further distinguishing this case from other Supreme Court precedents,
the court indicated that Michigan’s decision to define marriage in its
constitution was not unusual and lacked the “kind of malice or unthinking
prejudice the Constitution prohibits.” 360 The decisions in Cleburne and
Romer, the Sixth Circuit posited, turned on whether “anything but prejudice
to the affected class could explain the law.” 361 The Court, in those cases,
decided that there were none. Here, the Sixth Circuit concluded, plenty of
alternative explanations existed. 362
c. Quasi-Suspect Class
Next, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the Supreme Court’s four-part
test deemed homosexuals a quasi-suspect class necessitating the application
of heightened scrutiny. 363 In opposition to both the Ninth and Second
Circuits’ analyses and considering only two of the four factors, the court
found that homosexuals do not constitute a quasi-suspect class under this
test. 364

354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. (stating that zoning code applied only to homes for the intellectually disabled in a
“neighborhood that apparently wanted nothing to do with them”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 623 (1996) (considering validity of state wide initiative that denied only gays the
protection of existing antidiscrimination laws).
357. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 408 (6th Cir. 2014).
358. Id.
359. Id. (quoting Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013)).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 410.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 413.
364. See id. at 413–16.
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The argument that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class faced two
“impediments”: the first, the Sixth Circuit’s own precedent indicating that
rational basis review applies to sexual orientation classifications,365 and the
second, the fact that the Supreme Court has never held that sexual
orientation classifications should receive heightened review and “has not
recognized a new suspect class in more than four decades.” 366
First, the Sixth Circuit recognized that homosexuals have suffered a
“lamentable” history of discrimination.367 It also pointed out, however, that
the traditional definition of marriage being challenged in this case
developed “independently of this record of discrimination.” 368 Second, the
Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit in concluding that
homosexuals as a group are not so politically powerless that “extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process” is required. 369 Instead,
the court reasoned that since gay marriage was legalized in Massachusetts
eleven years ago, homosexuals have enjoyed “nearly as many successes as
defeats and a widely held assumption that the future holds more promise
than the past.” 370 As such, the court concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment is not designed to protect a group from the reality of
democratic initiatives, “some succeed, some fail.” 371 Accordingly, under
the Sixth Circuit’s analysis, homosexuals do not constitute a quasi-suspect
class. 372
d. Windsor III As Precedent
Lastly, the Sixth Circuit considered whether Windsor III, as plaintiffs’
claimed and the Ninth Circuit held, applied heightened scrutiny. 373 It held

365. Id. at 413 (citing Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2012);
Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260–61 (6th Cir. 2006); Stemler v.
City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873–74 (6th Cir. 1997)).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. “The traditional definition of marriage goes back thousands of years and spans
almost every society in history. By contrast, ‘American laws targeting same-sex couples did
not develop until the last third of the 20th century.’” Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 570 (2003)).
369. Id. at 415.
This is not a setting in which dysfunction mars the political process. It is not a
setting in which the recalcitrance of Jim Crow demands judicial, rather than wecan’t-wait-forever legislative, answers. It is not a setting in which time shows that
even a potentially powerful group cannot make headway on issues of equality. It
is not a setting where a national crisis—the Depression—seemingly demanded
constitutional innovation. And it is not a setting, most pertinently, in which the
local, state, and federal governments historically disenfranchised the suspect class,
as they did with African Americans and women.
Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 413.
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that it did not. 374 Rather, the Sixth Circuit placed Windsor III in its abovementioned “animus” category with Romer and Cleburne. 375
The Sixth Circuit interpreted Windsor III as a decision mostly about
federalism rather than as an endorsement of the application of heightened
scrutiny. 376 It found that the Supreme Court resolved Windsor III on the
“Romer ground,” that “anomalous exercises of power targeting a single
group raise suspicion that bigotry rather than legitimate policy is afoot.” 377
The reason DOMA was anomalous, the court posited, was because the
federal statute at issue “trespassed” on New York’s authority to define
marriage. 378 Without such an anomaly, there is no reason to infer that a
state law’s purpose was to impose a disadvantage, separate status, or stigma
on same-sex couples, and traditional rational basis would apply. 379
2. Other Circuits Hold That Sexual Orientation–Based Strikes
Are Permissible
Only the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have specifically
considered whether peremptory challenges based on sexual orientation are
eligible for prohibition under J.E.B. 380 Both the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits neglected to extend Batson to prohibit sexual orientation–based
peremptory challenges.
a. Sexual Orientation–Based Strikes Are Permissible
Unless the Supreme Court Holds Otherwise
First, all circuits which apply rational basis review to classifications
based on sexual orientation are precluded from extending Batson to prohibit
peremptory strikes on the basis of sexual orientation. 381 J.E.B. explicitly
permits peremptory strikes based on a characteristic defining a group
entitled to rational basis review. 382 Accordingly, in the Sixth Circuit, and
other circuits applying rational basis review, sexual orientation–based
peremptory challenges are necessarily permissible. Unsurprisingly, the
Eleventh and Eighth Circuits declined to extend Batson when they had the
opportunity, due primarily to the Supreme Court’s failure to do so.
Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in SmithKline, the Eighth Circuit
chose not to extend Batson in United States v. Blaylock. 383 Not electing to
374. Id.
375. Id. at 414.
376. Id. at 413.
377. Id. at 414.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 475 (9th Cir. 2014);
Sneed v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 496 F. App’x 20 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2005).
381. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (holding group must be
entitled to more than rational basis review to benefit from the protection of Batson).
382. See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
383. 421 F.3d 758, 769–70 (8th Cir. 2005).
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engage in the Supreme Court’s four-part quasi-suspect inquiry, the Eighth
Circuit reasoned that, “[a]lthough the California Supreme Court has held
sexual orientation should be a protected class for jury selection purposes,
and the Ninth Circuit has assumed, without deciding, sexual orientation
qualifies as a Batson classification, neither the Supreme Court nor this
circuit has so held.” 384 Similarly, in Sneed v. Florida Department of
Corrections, 385 the Eleventh Circuit dismissed an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim based on an attorney’s failure to object to a peremptory strike
of a homosexual juror, stating, “the Supreme Court has never held that
homosexuality is a protected class for purposes of analyzing discrimination
in jury selection under Batson.” 386
Moreover, since the Ninth Circuit’s decision in SmithKline, several
district courts have declined to adopt its rationale for want of binding
precedent. In Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 387 the District Court of Oregon refused
to consider SmithKline binding precedent. 388 It reasoned that at least one
judge of the Ninth Circuit made a sua sponte call for a rehearing en banc.389
Thus, no mandate issued from the case and it is not yet a final and binding
decision. 390 While the court recognized that it could independently reach
the same conclusion as the SmithKline court, it ultimately determined that
was not necessary in this case. 391
b. Batson Should Not Be Extended to Prohibit Peremptory Strikes
Based on Sexual Orientation
Even if the Sixth Circuit’s view is rejected, and homosexuals are deemed
a quasi-suspect class, it must be independently considered whether Batson
should be expanded to prohibit sexual orientation–based peremptory strikes.
This section will discuss the view, often appearing in dissenting or
concurring opinions, that Batson’s principles should not be applied to
prohibit peremptory strikes based on any characteristics other than race.
In Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in J.E.B., she warned of the potential
costs the Court’s extension to gender might have on the value of the
peremptory challenge. 392 The peremptory challenge’s purpose is to enable
parties to impanel fair and impartial juries. 393 “[B]y enabling each side to
exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other,”
extreme biases for one party or another are eliminated from the venire. 394
The very nature of a peremptory strike—that it is exercised without a stated
384. Id. at 769.
385. 496 F. App’x 20 (11th Cir. 2012).
386. Id. at 27.
387. 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014).
388. Id. at 1141.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147–51 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
393. Id. at 147.
394. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990).
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reason—is the source of its value. 395 This nature allows lawyers to strike
jurors on the basis of their experience, on often “inarticulable” clues and
hunches. 396
According to Justice O’Connor, with each constitutional limit on the use
of peremptory challenges, “we force lawyers to articulate what we know is
often inarticulable.” 397 In doing so, peremptory challenges become “less
discretionary” and biased jurors are more likely to make it onto the jury.398
In its extension of Batson to gender-based peremptory strikes, the Court
“[took] a step closer to eliminating the peremptory challenge, and
diminished the ability of litigants to act on sometimes accurate genderbased assumptions about juror attitudes.” 399 Analogously, again extending
Batson to prohibit sexual orientation–based peremptory challenges will
further deplete the value of the procedure. 400
Moreover, in his J.E.B. dissent, Justice Scalia doubted whether the
Constitution supports the limitation of the exercise of peremptory strikes at
all. 401 He reasoned that since all groups are equally subject to the
peremptory challenge, “it is hard to see how any group is denied equal
protection.” 402 Justice Scalia also challenged the majority’s limitation of
Batson’s scope based on the standard of review to which a group is
entitled. 403 The majority rejected the respondent’s argument that the
peremptory challenge of the men in this case furthered the government’s
395. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
396. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 149–50. “[T]o say that gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not to
say that gender makes no difference as a matter of fact.” Id. at 149. Saying gender does not
matter as a matter of law is also somewhat contradictory to past fair cross section cases
holding that woman bring a unique perspective and set of experiences to the jury. Id. at 157–
58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
If asked whether the racial or gender composition of a jury might have anything to
do with its eventual verdict, most Americans would probably agree that it does.
The assumption underlying this opinion is that men and women, blacks and whites,
the rich and the poor, may see the world in very different ways and that jurors’
differing world views may color their impressions of a case so much so that
different jurors may reach different decisions about a just verdict.
SEAN G. OVERLAND, THE JUROR FACTOR: RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICA’S CIVIL COURTS
11 (1973). “[R]esearch on juror decision-making in criminal trials with racial undertones,
such as cases in which the victim and the defendant are from different racial backgrounds,
has shown that blacks and whites often view the case very differently.” Id. at 20. A national
opinion poll taken to measure reactions to the O.J. Simpson trial, for example, revealed that
77 percent of white poll takers thought Simpson was guilty, while only 29 percent of black
poll takers thought he should be convicted. Id. Moreover, studies show that women are more
likely to convict in rape cases than are men. REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 140–41
(1983).
400. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 149–50 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
401. Id. at 159 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
402. Id. Justice Scalia states that he might think differently if a pattern of peremptory
strikes evidenced the systematic exclusion of a group from the venire. Id. at 160. He
indicates that here, that was not the case. Id. For every man stricken from the venire by one
party, a woman was stricken by the other. Id.
403. Id. at 160–61.
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interest in procuring an impartial jury by eliminating a group that may have
been partial to the defendants. 404 The majority also stated that it refused to
accept an argument based on “the very stereotype[s] the law condemns.”405
Justice Scalia, however, failed to see a reason why the law condemns
stereotyping of groups entitled to heightened or strict scrutiny but not those
entitled to rational basis review. 406 Accordingly, he questioned whether
characteristic-based strikes could even rationally further the government’s
interest in impaneling an impartial jury. 407
Justice Scalia also expressed a concern for the cost of this, and any
further, extension of Batson. 408 Stating that “there really is no substitute for
the peremptory,” he reasoned that criminal defendants would be most
affected by the majority’s decision.409 Moreover, recognizing that the
“biases that go along with group characteristics tend to be biases that the
juror himself does not perceive,” it would be “fruitless” to inquire about
them. 410 Without a fully powerful peremptory strike, therefore, many
jurors’ subliminal prejudices will go unchallenged. 411
It is clear that there are both costs and benefits to extending Batson to
prohibit sexual orientation–based peremptory challenges. Yet there are
equally crippling costs and meaningful benefits to maintaining the status
quo. It now must be considered whether, in the Batson realm, we can have
our cake and eat it too.
III. BATSON’S HOLDING SHOULD BE BOTH NARROWED AND EXPANDED
Any proposed change to the Batson regime must consider the two
constitutional rights affected by it:
a criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury and a juror’s Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection under the laws. 412 When Batson was decided, the
Supreme Court seemingly turned its focus away from maintaining a
powerful peremptory strike and prioritized the safeguard of jurors’ equal
protection rights. This Note attempts to preserve that priority but also
revitalize the power of the peremptory challenge.
Part III.A delves into the inconsistencies plaguing the Batson regime,
exploring the limits J.E.B. places on Batson and the flaws of J.E.B.’s
limiting principle. Part III.B proposes that Batson be both narrowed and
expanded to better balance the two constitutional rights at issue.

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

Id. at 160.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161–62.
Id. at 162.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 43–46, 109–62 and accompanying text.
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A. The Batson Regime’s Plague: Inconsistency
There are two reasons the current Batson framework is ineffective. First,
the stated and apparent purposes of Batson and its progeny are inconsistent
with Batson’s scope. While Batson’s rationale can seemingly be employed
to protect jurors from discrimination based on characteristics other than race
and gender, J.E.B. greatly hinders that possibility. 413 Second, Batson
rigidly applies standards of judicial review in a way that creates a
constitutional legal fiction. Under this application, as a matter of
constitutional law, race and gender never have a relevant impact on a
juror’s ability to be impartial, whereas a juror’s sexual orientation always
does. 414
1. The Batson Regime’s Purpose Seeks to Protect More Groups
than J.E.B.’s Limiting Principle Would Allow
When Batson was decided, both its holding and its purpose were very
focused. 415 The Supreme Court sought only to eradicate the racially
discriminatory exercise of peremptory strikes by prosecutors. 416 This focus
preserved the value of the peremptory strike and strictly limited Batson’s
application. 417 As Batson’s application and purpose have been expanded,
and that focus diluted, a limiting principle was necessary to maintain the
utility of the peremptory challenge. 418
In J.E.B., the Court articulated the needed limiting principle.419 While
peremptory strikes based on race and gender were prohibited, parties could
still exercise peremptory challenges against any group “normally subject to
‘rational basis’ review.” 420 This section discusses why Batson’s broadly
understood purpose cannot be reconciled with J.E.B.’s explicit allowance of
discriminatory peremptory strikes against certain groups.
a. Batson and J.E.B.: The Reason Peremptory Strikes
Based on Race and Gender Are Prohibited
In both Batson and J.E.B., the Supreme Court offered several rationales
for its limitations on the exercise of peremptory challenges. First, when
deciding Batson, the Court largely relied on the principles set forth in
Strauder, indicating that the purposeful discrimination employed during
jury selection violated a defendant’s Equal Protection rights. 421 Elaborating
further, the Court specified that the state unconstitutionally discriminated

413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

See infra Part III.A.1.
See infra Part III.A.2.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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against excluded jurors by relying on race to assess their competence.422
“A person’s race,” the Court explained, “simply ‘is unrelated to his fitness
as a juror.’” 423 Moreover, the Court concluded that the injuries precipitated
by purposeful discrimination extended beyond the courtroom to undermine
the public’s confidence in the “fairness of our system of justice.” 424
In J.E.B., the Supreme Court responded to several arguments that
Batson’s rationale could not be applied to justify the prohibition of genderbased peremptory challenges. 425 Analogizing, the Court ultimately held
that, like race, gender “is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence
and impartiality.” 426 In concluding so, the Court cited the history of
discrimination against women in the United States, deciding that in order to
expand Batson, the Court
need not determine . . . whether women or racial minorities have suffered
more at the hands of discriminatory state actors during the decades of our
Nation’s history. It is necessary only to acknowledge that “our Nation has
had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination” . . . . 427

Moreover, J.E.B.’s holding, extending Batson to prohibit gender-based
strikes, implies that narrowly viewing Batson’s purpose as specific to race
is untenable. The Court reasoned broadly that, “[W]hether the trial is
criminal or civil, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal
protection right to jury selection procedures that are free from statesponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical
prejudice.” 428 The Court recognized that veniremen “have the right not to
be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypical
presumptions that reflect and reinforce patterns of historical
discrimination.” 429 In making these broad statements, the Court left a
serious question unanswered: Why only race and gender?
b. Inconsistencies Between the Court’s Limiting Principle
and its Reasoning
Batson’s rationale, especially as it has been more recently interpreted in
J.E.B., can seemingly be employed to justify the prohibition of peremptory
strikes based on other cognizable group characteristics. The Supreme Court
explicitly hindered courts from doing so, however, when it articulated
J.E.B.’s limiting principle.
Admittedly, the need for such a limiting principle is quite impressive.
Peremptory strikes serve several important functions, not the least of which,
422. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
423. Id. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)).
424. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
425. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129, 136.
426. Id. at 129.
427. Id. at 136; see supra note 161 and accompanying text.
428. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 128. “The community is harmed by the State’s participation in
the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our
judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders.” Id. at 140.
429. Id. at 141–42.
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is its status as an important procedural safeguard of a criminal defendant’s
right to an impartial jury. 430 The further limited the exercise of peremptory
challenges becomes, the less able defendants are to protect that right.431
The issue is not at all that a limiting principle exists, but rather that the
chosen limiting principle quite seriously fails to serve Batson’s purposes.
Consider that the groups Batson protects are not uniquely vulnerable to
discrimination, whereas, at least one group to which J.E.B. denies this
protection, is vulnerable. Currently, Batson and J.E.B. protect two groups
that, historically, have been rather immune to discrimination: whites and
men. 432 In Batson, the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of
peremptory strikes excluding blacks from a jury. 433 It held more broadly,
however, that “race” could not motivate a strike. 434 This protects whites
from discrimination during voir dire as much as it protects blacks.435
Similarly, and quite strangely, J.E.B. cited the history of discrimination
against women to justify its conclusion that the respondent’s gender-based
strikes against men were unconstitutional. 436 Yet, in all but two circuits,
the level of judicial scrutiny applied to classifications based on sexual
orientation renders the history of discrimination against homosexuals
irrelevant to justify Batson’s extension. 437
c. Sexual Orientation: An Example of the Inconsistency
Sexual orientation is an obvious illustration of the incongruence of
Batson’s rationales and J.E.B.’s limiting principle. While J.E.B. prevents
Batson from being applied to prohibit sexual orientation–based peremptory
strikes in all but two circuits, Batson and J.E.B.’s rationales effortlessly
justify their prohibition. When deciding whether to prohibit peremptory
strikes based on race and gender, the Court considered several issues.
These include: (1) whether a characteristic is related to one’s fitness as a
juror, (2) whether discrimination against a group “undermines” the public’s
confidence in the justice system, and (3) whether the group defined by the
characteristic has historically experienced discrimination.438 Consider
these factors as applied to sexual orientation.
First, sexual orientation, like race and gender, is entirely unrelated to a
juror’s ability to impartially evaluate a case. 439 One need not be an expert
of any kind to realize that sexual orientation is not a characteristic having
any effect on one’s intelligence, ability to listen, reason, or apply the law to
430. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing merits of peremptory challenge procedure).
431. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
432. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding race-based peremptory strikes
are unconstitutional); see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127 (holding that gender-based peremptory
strikes are unconstitutional).
433. See supra Part I.B.2.
434. See supra Part I.B.2.
435. See supra Part I.B.2.
436. See supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
437. See supra Part II.B.2.; supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
438. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
439. See supra notes 265–69 and accompanying text.
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a set of facts. Not only is this issue “not much in debate,” but a majority of
cases which have “meaningfully considered” the question so hold. 440
Second, as the Court stated in J.E.B., jurors have a right not to be
“summarily” dismissed based on assumptions which tend to reinforce
historical prejudice. 441 Such an allowance would send a message to the
public that certain individuals are “presumed unqualified by state actors to
decide important questions.” 442 In fact, it seems certain that permitting
citizens to be dismissed from juries based solely on their sexual orientation,
or any characteristic not affecting their fitness as a juror, perpetuates this
appearance of unfairness, and results in a “loss of confidence” in the
judicial system. 443
Third, as recognized by the Second Circuit in Windsor II, homosexuals
have endured government-sponsored discrimination since, at least, the
1920s. 444 Yet, despite the simplicity with which these factors justify the
prohibition of sexual orientation–based peremptory challenges, J.E.B.’s
limiting principle remains an obstacle. 445 This obstacle is caused,
principally, by its rigid application of the three-tiered system of judicial
review. 446
2. J.E.B.’s Limiting Principle Rigidly Applies
Standards of Judicial Review in a Way That Fails to Consider
the Factual Circumstances of Each Case
J.E.B. rigidly utilizes the three-tiered system of judicial review applied in
all Equal Protection cases to control Batson’s expansion. 447 This section
discusses how J.E.B.’s flawed limiting principle creates a legal fiction
whereby race and gender are never constitutionally relevant to a juror’s
ability to be impartial, and sexual orientation is always relevant. It also
demonstrates the ways in which this limiting principle is inconsistent with
the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment.
No matter the basis of a discriminatory peremptory strike, or the level of
judicial scrutiny applied to review it, the exerciser of a peremptory strike
has the same compelling, important, or legitimate interest. 448 This interest
is in safeguarding a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury. 449 After Batson, regardless of the factual circumstances of a
case, a race-conscious peremptory strike will never survive strict scrutiny as
a narrowly tailored means of furthering this compelling interest.450
Likewise, after J.E.B., gender-based explanations will never be thought to
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

See supra notes 265–69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994).
Id. at 140.
See supra notes 265–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.A.2.
See supra Part I.C.1.
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143.
Id.
See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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further this important interest under intermediate scrutiny. 451 Both of these
principles are supported by explanation and reasoning. 452 J.E.B.’s limiting
principle, on the other hand, was articulated without any justification.
J.E.B.’s allowance of discriminatory peremptory strikes against some
groups suggests that peremptory challenges based on characteristics
defining groups entitled to rational basis review are always deemed
rationally related to furthering the state’s legitimate interest.453 This,
seemingly, cannot be true. In light of the fact that sexual orientation does
not bear on a juror’s fitness to serve, how can a sexual orientation–based
strike rationally further the interest of impanelling an impartial jury, in say,
an arson case? In SmithKline, there was, at the very least, a rational
stereotype-based argument that a homosexual juror may be biased against a
company affecting the cost of HIV medication, considering the gay
community’s historical relationship with the disease. 454 In an arson case,
by contrast, no similar rationality exists. A homosexual juror seemingly
would be no more or less likely to be partial than a heterosexual juror. Yet,
under Batson, sexual orientation is a permissible basis for peremptory
dismissal in all but the Ninth Circuit. 455
Moreover, as Justice O’Connor articulates in her J.E.B. concurrence, this
system fails to consider that race, gender, and other similar characteristics
matter. 456 Studies have shown that, in certain types of cases, one’s race,
gender, and other characteristics truly do affect whether one votes to
convict or not. 457 Even without empirical studies, one need not be racist,
sexist, or homophobic to infer that such defining characteristics would
greatly impact, for example, a juror’s evaluation of an alleged hate crime
against a member of a group to which the juror also belongs. 458
Simply stated, it is quite contradictory to say that, on the one hand,
“jurors are not expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all that
their human experience has taught them,” 459 and, on the other hand,
preclude litigants from considering the effects of human experience
resulting from one’s race or gender. 460 Justice O’Connor posited that this
application of the three-tiered system of judicial review has created a legal
fiction. 461 As a matter of constitutional law, she stated, race and gender are
never relevant when exercising peremptory strikes. 462 This Note expands
on that idea. Not only are race and gender never relevant, but under the
current Batson regime, sexual orientation is always relevant.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

See generally J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143.
See supra notes 111–35, 158–62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 180–85 and accompanying text.
See supra Introduction.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 149 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980).
See supra notes 111–35, 158–62 and accompanying text.
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 149.
Id.
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Justice Scalia further illuminated the flaws of the Batson regime in his
J.E.B. dissent, where he discussed the irrationality of the majority’s limiting
principle. 463 To him, it seemed as though there was no reason to conclude
that a stereotype-motivated peremptory strike furthered a government
interest only if the stereotyped person happens to be a member of a group
entitled to mere rational basis review. 464
Justice Scalia’s discussion of the limiting principle highlights yet another
inconsistency plaguing the Batson regime. While Batson and J.E.B.
expressly prohibit court-sponsored discrimination, J.E.B. also expressly
sanctions it. It forces one to consider whether the Equal Protection Clause
is more faithfully served by the pre-Batson regime where all groups are
subject to discriminatory peremptory strikes (as Justice Scalia argues) or the
current regime where some groups are and others are not? 465
Further exasperating the unequal protection afforded certain groups under
Batson is the current circuit split facilitated by J.E.B.’s limiting principle.
The principle forces a court seeking to end court-sponsored discrimination
of homosexuals first, independently to prove (as the Ninth and Second
Circuits have) that homosexuals are entitled to heightened scrutiny.466
Some courts, however, have simultaneously expressed the opinion that
homosexuals should be entitled to heightened scrutiny and refused to apply
the standard absent the Supreme Court’s endorsement. 467 Other courts
have argued that heightened scrutiny should not be applied. 468 This is quite
problematic.
First, under the Supreme Court’s own four-part test, homosexuals
seemingly constitute a quasi-suspect class. 469 Second, for years, even
absent the prerequisite quasi-suspect status, the Supreme Court has been
applying a standard of review more rigorous than traditional rational basis
The Supreme Court’s
to classifications involving homosexuals. 470
reluctance to define homosexuality as a suspect class is steadfast, however.
Most recently, in Windsor III, the Supreme Court neither stated which level
of scrutiny it was applying nor engaged in an analysis even resembling
traditional rational basis review. 471 Moreover, as Justice Scalia points out
in his dissent, “The opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even
mention what had been the central question in [the] litigation: whether,
under the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a
woman are reviewed for more than mere rationality.” 472 As a result of the
463. See supra notes 401–07 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 401–07 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 401–02 and accompanying text.
466. See supra Part II.B.1.
467. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
468. See supra Part II.C.1.a.
469. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
470. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
471. Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As nearly as I can
tell, the Court[’s] . . . opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions are
taken from rational-basis cases like Moreno. But the Court certainly does not apply anything
that resembles that deferential framework.”).
472. Id.
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Court’s avoidance of this issue, lower courts choosing to wait for the
Supreme Court to define sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect class are
stuck endorsing discrimination of homosexuals based on historically
informed stereotypes, until the Court decides to address the question. 473
In sum, the problem precipitated by J.E.B.’s limiting principle is that a
group that seemingly deserves Batson’s protection is entitled to such in only
the Ninth Circuit and eligible for it in just one other.474 This “conflict of
authority” is eerily similar to the one the Court meant to solve by granting
certiorari in J.E.B. 475
B. How Batson’s Holding Should Be Both Narrowed and Expanded
While the stated criticisms of the Batson regime motivate this Note to
suggest that Batson should be applied to prohibit sexual orientation–based
peremptory strikes, as in the Ninth Circuit, it also recognizes that this would
impermissibly burden a defendant’s ability to protect his Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury. For this reason, this Note suggests, not only that
Batson be expanded but also that its holding be narrowed to re-empower the
peremptory strike.
1. Proposed Limiting Principle
First, this Note suggests that Batson’s protection should be afforded to
groups defined by immutable characteristics that do not affect one’s
competence as a juror. Whereas the group a juror freely associates with
may lead to logical inferences regarding their opinions and biases,
immutable characteristics are not usually as informative. Moreover,
generalizations made on the basis of immutable characteristics are very
often rooted in historical stereotypes. The groups we freely associate with,
on the other hand, provide factual bases for such group generalizations.
This limiting principle would solve two problems. First, by expanding
Batson’s application to more groups, J.E.B. would no longer prevent Batson
from prohibiting purposeful discrimination. Second, by decoupling Batson
from the three-tiered system of judicial review even those courts which
apply rational basis review to sexual orientation classifications would be
able to prohibit sexual orientation–based classifications.
2. Narrowing Batson’s Scope
To compensate for the proposed expansion’s hindrance on a defendant’s
ability to protect his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, Batson’s
first step should be altered. This Note proposes that a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination be established in only two circumstances.
473. See supra Part II.B.2.
474. See supra Part II.B.1.
475. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130 (1994) (“We granted certiorari to
resolve a question that has created a conflict of authority—whether the Equal Protection
Clause forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of gender as well as on the basis of
race.”).
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First, a prima facie case of discrimination must be found where a pattern
of peremptory strikes indicates that a group is being systematically
excluded from the jury. Succinctly justifying this prohibition, Justice
Marshall stated, “[i]t is not necessary to assume that the excluded group
will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its
exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have
unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.” 476
Second, a prima facie case of discrimination must also be found where
(1) very convincing evidence of discrimination exists and (2) proving a
“pattern” of strikes against a certain group is impossible because only one
member of that group is present on the venire. Such a system would
necessarily allow a prima facie case to be found in a situation similar to that
in SmithKline, where the only self-identified homosexual member of the
The relationship of the gay
venire was peremptorily stricken. 477
community to HIV, along with counsel’s failure to ask any questions
regarding other bases of exclusion, leads to the permissible inference,
sufficient to establish a prima facie case, that his peremptory strike may
have been motivated by the juror’s sexual orientation. 478 While perhaps
over-inclusive, this principle ensures that discrimination against a numerical
minority on the venire does not go unchecked, and that a fair cross-section
of the community may potentially include its minority members.
By making it more difficult to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, it allows peremptory strikes to be exercised with more
discretion. 479 In doing so, it may be that a peremptory strike exercised on
the hunch that a person’s race, gender, sexual orientation, et cetera has
rendered him or her biased. And admittedly, isolated instances of such
would be unchallengeable. Yet it is not certain or even probable that the
number of discriminatory peremptory strikes detected by the court will be
affected. Without the strong systematic exclusion or pretext evidence this
Note would require, it is likely the Court will accept any plausible reason
for a strike, regardless of its truth or relevance. 480
Furthermore, this cost is certainly balanced by the benefit of extending
Batson’s protection to several historically discriminated against groups that
are not currently eligible for it. In providing this protection, this resolution
also re-empowers the peremptory strike by making an effective challenge
less common and thereby restores some of the practice’s discretionary
nature.
CONCLUSION
Consider again the example presented in the Introduction of this Note.
When a Batson challenge was made following the peremptory strike of a

476.
477.
478.
479.
480.

Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972).
See supra Introduction.
See supra Introduction.
See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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suspected homosexual from the venire, the judge replied, “Well, I don’t
know . . . whether Batson ever applies to sexual orientation.” 481 In so
stating, this judge expressed doubt whether court-sponsored discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation is permissible. The answer to that
question should clearly be: “No.”
Batson and subsequent cases flaunt the ideal that discrimination against
jurors will not be tolerated, and yet it is. It may be that voir dire
proceedings are not effectively designed to render the reliance on “group
stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice” unnecessary.482
It may be that discrimination is an unfortunate means to a necessary end.
While the solution this Note proposes does not claim to solve all of these
problems, it does solve one.
In J.E.B., the Court, quoting Strauder, derisively described the allowance
of peremptory strikes based on gender as “practically a brand upon
[women], affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.” 483 Extending
Batson to prohibit the exercise of peremptory strikes based on a juror’s
sexual orientation, at the very least, eliminates this “brand” on the gay
community.

481. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 475 (9th Cir. 2014).
482. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994).
483. Id. at 141 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).

